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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTHERN
DESEGREGATION: THE CHAPEL HILL
STORY*
DANIEL H. POLLITTt
In 1963-1964, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, joined the ever-in-
creasing number of southern communities to experience an effort at
racial integration by tactics variously called "creative disorder,"'
scofflaw Christianity,"' and "insurrection and rebellion." 3 News-
paper headlines give flavor and dimension to what took place:
New Year Brings Race Violence to Chapel Hill4
Chapel Hill Board Sidesteps Accommodations Law Issue5
Governor Sanford Warns CORE on Chapel Hill Ultimatums
University Won't Boycott Segregated Firms7
Sit-Ins, Arrests, Mediation Continues
Stepped Up Sit-Downs Block Town's Traffic9
Men's Council Acquits Student Demonstrator"
Hearing on 932 Cases in Federal Court on Tuesday"
Judge Cites Student Editor for Contempt'2
5 Protest Fasters Under Harrassment 8
* Research on this article was assisted by a grant from the Walter E.
Meyer Research Institute of Law, Inc.
f Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Visit-
ing Professor of Law, University of Oregon, 1964-1965.1 The term is borrowed by Harvard sociologist David Riesman in his
foreword to The Free Man, a book by Chapel Hill novelist John Ehle which
portrays with critical sympathy the events which follow. Riesman, Foreword
to EHLE, THE FREE MEN at ix (1965) [hereinafter cited as EHLE].
2The term is that of Henry Brandis, Jr., Dean Emeritus of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina School of Law, in reference to the Chapel Hill
ministers who defended the street-blocking tactics by the student demon-
strators.
'The term is that of City Councilman Roland Giduz in connection with
a sit-in at the City Hall.
'Daily Tar Heel, Jan. 7, 1964, p. 1.
'Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 14, 1964, p. 9A, col. 3.
Id., Jan. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
Chapel Hill Weekly, Jan. 29, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
Id., Feb. 2, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
o Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
" Id., Feb. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
"1 Chapel Hill Weekly, March 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.2 Durham Morning Herald, March 18, p. 1, col. 4.
"8 Chapel Hill Weekly, March 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
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Ku Klux Klan Comes to Chapel Hill .. .14
Mallard Sends 4 More Domonstrators to Jail; Dunne Gets
Year 15
So it went through five long months of December, January, Febru-
ary, March, and April. The administrators of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (which is almost the sole employer
and dominates the rural community of 15,000) shut their eyes to the
problem with a position of neutrality ;"6 the city fathers sidestepped
leadership by appointing a series of citizen committees to seek de-
segregation on a voluntary basis; while the protagonists, the dem-
onstrators and white shop owners, grew ever more adamant in their
demands for unconditional surrender. The demands, the tactics, the
legal and moral problems are familiar throughout the South; the
only wonder is that it could happen in Chapel Hill, the most "en-
lightened" town in the most "enlightened" state in the South, self-
styled the "Southern Part of Heaven."'' 1  This article will discuss
in sequence the events which took place in Chapel Hill and the legal
issues growing out of these events.
I. THE EVENTS
A. The Community Background
The community has not been a leader in racial desegregation,
but neither has it lagged too far behind. In 1951, the University
(pursuant to court order) admitted Negroes to the medical and law
1
" Id., March 29, 1964, p. 2B, col. 1.
' Daily Tar Heel, April 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.The University, if anything, was "neutral" on the side of segregation.
It refused to eliminate the vestiges of segregation in the University Hospital.
It refused to transfer the weekly athletic press luncheons from the segre-
gated Pines Restaurant and thereby withdraw its prestige and support from
the target of the student demonstrations. It refused to carry on its educa-
tional television station a controversial series of programs produced by the
National Educational Network. The series, "Dynamics of Desegregation,"
was the first NET series turned down by the University. EHLE 174, 175, 202,
203. The University even instituted, but never put into effect, a rule that
Negro students would be segregated from white students in the dormitories.
Id. at 325. As far back as 1950 the Supreme Court held that a university
cannot afford the Negro student different treatment from other students
solely because of his race because such isolations "impair and inhibit his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
"
0
a See PRINCE, THE SOUTHERN PART OF HEAVEN (1950). See also
Time, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 42.
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schools;17 and in 1955 (again pursuant to court order) as under-
graduates."8 No difficulties resulted from these admissions; indeed,
Negroes have been elected to important campus positions.'
In 1960, the Chapel Hill School Board (dominated by University
professors) complied in part with the 1954 Supreme Court mandate
in the famous School Desegregation Cases2" by ordering school
integration at the first grade level on a voluntary basis. The integra-
tion plan subsequently was extended to all grades, with no difficulties
in the community.2 '
Also in 1960, a number of restaurants agreed to serve Negroes.
This resulted from a series of sit-ins, picketing, full-page ads by the
Ministerial Association, and intervention by a newly created Mayor's
Human Relations Committee.2
In 1961, the town's two movie theaters were picketed constantly
for four months and then agreed to admit Negroes. Thereafter,
there were no unpleasant incidents, and there was no loss of busi-
ness.
23
Progress was manifest and visible, but in July of 1963, much
remained to be done. The three motels (although not the University-
owned Carolina Inn), the only bowling alley, all the barbershops
except the one located in the campus student union, approximately
a third of the restaurants (especially those ringing the town), two
grocery stores fronting the highways leading into the community,
and several service stations were segregated; some with "White
Only" signs in prominent display.2 4 A movement was then initiated
for the enactment of a public accommodations law prohibiting dis-
crimination, at least by restaurants. There were public discussion,
petitions, newspaper advertisements, and a series of "silent marches."
The Board of Aldermen rejected the proposed public accommoda-
17 McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 951 (1951).
" Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955).
" For example, that of Editor-in-Chief of the Review. See N.Y. Times,
May 5, 1961, p. 18, col. 2.
"0 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Prothro, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: A Case Study of a Community's
Needs in Relations to H.R. 7152 (The Civil Rights Act) (1964).
"2 Ibid.
3Ibid.
24A survey revealed discrimination at 25% of the 116 businesses in-
cluded within a study of barber shops, billiard parlors, drugstores, groceries,
hospitals, ice cream parlors, motels, restaurants, and service stations. Daily
Tar Heel, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
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tions law with a substitution motion to create a new committee to
seek desegregation on a voluntary basis. The silent marches then
turned into direct action, with a sit-in at the office of the Merchants
Association (which had spearheaded the campaign against the public
accommodations law), and thirty-four persons were jailed in short
order. The town was in an uproar, and the Mayor intervened to
secure a truce: all demonstrations would cease, the charges against
the demonstrators would be dropped, and the Mayor would seek
to bring about further integration on a voluntary basis. 5
B. The Sit-Ins
The truce agreement failed. The demonstrations stopped, but
the charges against the demonstrators were not dropped: four
demonstrators were tried, and three elected to serve sentences of
thirty days rather than pay the fine of fifty dollars. The newly
created Mayor's Human Relations Committee made no progress.
So matters stood on December 13, 1964, when a visiting speaker
was invited to dinner by three University students, one white, two
Negro. In his words:
We drove out to the Pines, Chapel Hill's only elegant eatery,
and walked in. The hostess dashed over as soon as we got in
the door and asked us to leave. Dunne [the white student]
didn't refuse, but he didn't leave. The manager, a Mr. Leroy
Merritt, came on the scene. He exploded almost immediately:
"We're segregated! Everybody in Chapel Hill knows we're
segregated! You got to leave right now!" Dunne spoke quietly
about how he had made a reservation by phone and hadn't been
told Negroes wouldn't be served, and pointing to me, said I
was a visiting speaker and he had planned to have me out for
dinner at the best place in town, and now he was terribly em-
barrassed, etc....
All this time the moral elite of Chapel Hill continued to
come into the restaurant, walk by, and sit down to their dinners.
And all this time Mr. Leroy Merritt got redder in the face
and kept yelling, "You gotta get out of here!" Then he called
the police. They arrived almost at once ....
The four of us were ushered out and, to our dismay, noti-
fied we would be arrested as soon as Mr. Leroy Merritt could
get down to the station to sign the warrants. Would we be so
kind as to come down to the station at 8 p.m. for arrest, by
which time the warrants would be ready? Yes, we would.20
2 Prothro, supra note 21.
" A New Kind of Christmas in Chapel Hill, reprinted from The Village
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The arrest did not stop matters; in fact it had the opposite effect.
A day or so later, another integrated group arrived at the Pines for
dinner and were denied service. When the police arrived, the
demonstrators went "limp," i.e., they relaxed, fell on the floor, and
had to be carried out. Pictures of a policeman dragging a white
coed across a rough parking lot, of two policemen more gingerly
carrying an eighty-year-old Episcopal minister to a police car, were
recruitment fodder to the growing group of demonstrators.
On December 14, two white and two Negro demonstrators
entered Clarence's Beer Hall (near the bus station) and were
bodily picked up and ungently tossed out on the street.2 7 Other
groups were arrested that night when they ordered a Coke at the
Shack, another downtown beer hall, or sought service at Leo's
Restaurant (which serves the bus station). At the Tar Heel Sand-
wich Shop (diagonally across from the city hall), the demonstrators
were locked out and sat on the sidewalk where they were kicked by
white bystanders until the police arrived from across the street.
Seventeen demonstrators were arrested, one taken to the hospital,
and the police went out looking for the white attackers. A house-
painter and an off-duty policeman from Hillsboro (the nearby county
seat) were subsequently arrested.
On December 15, seventy people marched silently through Chapel
Hill with signs which read: "Give Freedom for Christmas"; and
after the march, forty of them were arrested at Brady's Restaurant
when they went limp after being denied service. The deans from
the University arrived and offered to bail out any student who
would agree to withdraw from the demonstrations; one of them
did. The deans notified, by phone and telegram, the parents of the
other students that their children were in jail.28
Six of the demonstrators then braved the Rock Pile, a segregated
grocery store. They walked in, ordered a box of crackers, and were
told to leave. When they refused, the manager began to douse the
unresisting demonstrators with a mixture of clorox and ammonia.
Some left choking, others stuck it out. Finally, the manager got
out a baseball bat, but the police then arrived and stopped further
Voice (of Greenwich Village, New York City). in the Daily Tar Heel, Jan.
7, 1964, p. 3, cols. 1, 4-5.
The individual sit-ins are described in EHLE 123-30.
u At least one parent did not appreciate this manifestation of University
concern, as it merely served to inform everyone in his small community
that his son had been arrested for demonstrating. Id. at 132.
1965]
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mayhem. The demonstrators were taken to the hospital, treated
for first degree burns, and then arrested for trespass and resisting
arrest (several had gone "limp" when they escaped the gas-fumed
interior) .29
By the New Year, almost 150 demonstrators had been arrested
while awaiting service at some seven or eight different restaurants.
The town newspaper seemed to pooh-pooh the whole episode as
some sort of a new-fangled student prank, which probably prompted
a group of professors from the University of North Carolina and
Duke to add their age and prestige to the effort for equal service.
Their initial target, on the night of January 3, was Watts' Grill, on
the southern outskirts of town. Professor Albert Amon later testi-
fied in court what happened.
We arrived in front of two sets of swinging glass doors.
As we got up, Mrs. Watts and a waitress were standing behind
these doors. I pulled one of them towards me and said, "May
we come in?" And then in the background . . . "Yes, let him
come in." Then he, Mr. Watts . . .took me by the coat ....
And pulled me forcibly into the restaurant. Then I stood for
about twenty to thirty seconds, I would say, while they mo-
mentarily redirected their attention to those who were standing
outside. Then they turned on me and Mr. Watts and Mr. Scott
hit me. I fell to the floor .... I received five blows, kicks to
the head which were large enough to be medically detectable,
three of which were severe, one of which opened my hair in a
3Y2 inch patch on the back of my head.30
Two students then entered the restaurant and threw themselves
atop the professor's prone body to protect him from further kicking.
Then, as Professor Amon continued his testimony: "[W]e were
lifted and thrown out, flying through the air, landing on top of the
seated professors on the outside. While we were out there, we
continued to be beaten with a broom .... 31
The police arrived, Professor Amon was taken to the hospital,
the other professors to jail. Included in the "jailed group" were
three Methodist ministers from the School of Divinity of Duke
University. Mr. Watts was not arrested.
The student Daily Tar Heel was then in recess, and the other
local papers (one owned by Councilman Giduz) gave scant heed to
2 9 Id. at 141-43.
801d. at 146-47.
8"Id. at 147.
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the details of the sit-ins. However, thirty miles away the Raleigh
News and Observer editorialized against these and similar tactics
utilized against the demonstrators:
The word already has been spread in Chapel Hill and the na-
tion, too, that the wife of the proprietor of one segregated cafe
stood above a floored demonstrator and urinated upon him.
Such action in supposed defense of Southern custom gives a
sickening impression of some of those who assume to defend
old ways in Chapel Hill.3 2
C. A Public Accommodation Law Again Considered
As the University and Negro high school students (who formed
the bulk of what became the Chapel Hill Freedom Committee) con-
tinued to demonstrate with marches and sit-ins, a portion of the
adult community took action. The Committee of Concerned Citizens,
mostly ministers, professors, and church women, began to picket the
segregated restaurants. Tired of picketing, it suggested the enact-
ment of a city ordinance requiring all businesses licensed to serve
the public to serve all members of the public. Within a matter of
two or three days, almost 2,000 citizens agreed over the telephone
to let their names be included in a newspaper advertisement urging
the city council to enact such an ordinance."' A rival petition against
such a law received only seventy-one signatures.35 The Board of
Aldermen agreed to consider the proposal at its meeting on Monday,
January 14, 1964.
On Sunday, January 13, there was a "freedom walk" from Dur-
ham to Chapel Hill to support the enactment of the proposed law.
Some 200 demonstrators from Durham, mostly students at Duke
and North Carolina College, marched the fifteen mile distance in a
freezing rain. As they reached the outskirts of Chapel Hill, they
were joined by an equal number of local citizens, and they marched
together through the main street to a Negro church where CORE
national director James Farmer highlighted a meeting.3 6
Prospects for the enactment of the public accommodations law
appeared bright. The University's Institute of Government prepared
" Reprinted in the Daily Tar Heel, March 12, 1964, p. 2, cols. 1-2.
" See id., Jan. 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
" Chapel Hill Weekly, Jan. 12, 1964, pp. 2-3.
" EHLE 157.
" Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 13, 1964, p. 1-B, col. 5.
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a legal memorandum supporting the town's authority to enact such
legislation." It appeared popular in the community. The Ministerial
Association supported it. The Chairman of the Mayor's Human
Relations Committee supported the law because her committee, and
the Mayor's Businessmen Committee, had done everything possible
to achieve desegregation by voluntary means, and had failed. The
only public opposition, apart from the petition of seventy-one busi-
nessmen, came from the local newspaper. In an editorial incon-
gruous to "states' righters," the Chapel Hill Weekly claimed that
"the Chapel Hill Board of Aldermen ... is not the proper place to
originate law which bears so directly on fundamental freedoms....
We hope the Town Board will direct those seekilig redress of racial
injustice to a somewhat higher authority."3 "
When the meeting opened, Alderman Adelaide Walters intro-
duced a public accommodations law patterned on the one enacted in
Rockville, Maryland,;9 and supported it by quoting from President
Johnson's then recent State of the Union4" message: "All members
of the public should be given equal access to facilities open to the
public." She said the President's statement seems "reasonable to
most people in Chapel Hill since this is a university town where
freedom flavors the spirit of a great university."' She reckoned
without her colleagues, however, for the Aldermen voted four to two
for a substitute motion to create yet another committee to seek in-
tegration on a voluntary basis. 42
Reaction was varied. A group of demonstrators sat all night
in twenty-three-degree weather on the city hall steps to protest.
Inside, a determined young lady began a two week sit-in vigil (until
the next scheduled Alderman meeting) to remind the Aldermen of
their "unfinished business." At least one of the segregated business
owners was also disappointed that the Aldermen had appointed a
new committee to urge integration on a voluntary basis. The man
who had used the ammonia wrote the new committee that:
" Subsequently, North Carolina Assistant Attorney General Ralph Moody,
who had defended city ordinances requiring segregation in places of public
accommodation, advised that North Carolina cities are without authority to
enact ordinances prohibiting segregation in places of public accommoda-
tion. Id., Jan. 29, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
" Chapel Hill Weekly, Jan. 12, 1964, p. 2-B, col. 2.
" See 7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 266 (1962).
,0 N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1964, p. 16.
41 Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 14, 1964, p. 9A, col. 3.
,2 Chapel Hill Weekly, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
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All we ask is not to be molested by any group, this includes
not only the groups the demonstrators belong to or follow, but
to all the race committees and different groups which we truly
feel are only causing the two races to draw further apart instead
of closer together....43
D. The Street Sit-Ins
CORE national director James Farmer had come to Chapel
Hill for the "walk for freedom" on the Sunday preceding the Monday
Aldermen vote on the public accommodations law. He had been
unable to leave Chapel Hill because of bad flying conditions, and on
Tuesday he held a press conference which completely altered the up-
to-then generally friendly attitude toward the demonstrators. Farm-
er told the press that "I dislike ultimata; I dislike deadlines ... but
we believe Chapel Hill should live up to its reputation as a leader
in racial relations." He then threatened that if Chapel Hill were
not desegregated by February 1, "all the resources of the national
office of CORE will be focused on the city."4
Reaction was swift and unfriendly. On the next day, Governor
Terry Sanford pledged his full support to the Chapel Hill Aldermen,
and warned CORE that the state "will not allow any group to
coerce public officials with threats or ultimatums."45 Dr. I. Beverly
Lake, the segregationist gubernatorial candidate was even more
blunt. He characterized the CORE ultimatum as a "brazen threat,"
as "intolerable," and urged the quick dismissal of any faculty mem-
ber, employee, or student participating in the demonstrations.4"
The town purchased a "paddy-wagon" (a reconverted bread
truck) to facilitate arrests, made arrangements for police reinforce-
ments with the state police and the nearby city of Burlington, and
girded itself for the February 1 deadline. A small group of citizens
sought to head off the collision, and invited the demonstration
leaders to meet with the top town officials in a church. There, the
demonstrators agreed that the February 1 deadline was not rigid,
and could be called off if there was hope of progress. Their main
demands centered around the town's prosecuting attorney: that he
be instructed to agree to postponement of the si4-in trials until the
Supreme Court had opportunity to rule on the similar cases pending
1EHLE 176.
"Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 1-B, col. 3.
"Id., Jan. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
40 Ibid.
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there; that he be instructed to agree to bail bonds in trespass cases
in the nominal amount usually set; and that he be instructed to
practice courtesy toward the Negro citizens in his official courthouse
business. These compromise proposals came to naught.
On Saturday, February 1, Chapel Hill Chief of Police Blake was
ready for any eventuality with about 100 police reinforcements, over
thirty patrol cars, and the new paddy-wagon. In mid-afternoon, over
350 demonstrators marched from a Negro church, down the main
street to the Town Hall where freedom songs were sung, and then
back to the church. As they marched, small groups totaling twenty-
two persons peeled off from the main body and sat themselves down
in the street intersections where they were promptly arrested and
hauled off in the new paddy-wagon. That night, forty-four persons
were arrested at a sit-in in Brady's restaurant; and just down the
road, nine more when they tried to buy groceries at the Rock Pile.
All told, seventy-five persons were arrested that day.4 Six of
these were white hecklers, one of whom had picked up a shovel when
the demonstration marched past the Western Auto store and who
had begun hitting every Negro within reach.
This was a prelude to the following Saturday, when the town was
filled with visitors to attend the traditional basketball game between
North Carolina and Wake Forest. In a concerted move, the demon-
strators lay down on all four major highways at about 4:00 p.m.
when the roads were jammed with cars leaving the game. Ninety-
eight street-blockers were arrested, the largest number of single
arrests since the demonstrations began at the Pines Restaurant on
December 12.
A Daily Tar Heel reporter followed one of the street-blocking
groups, and here is his inside view:
"They will try to tell you that you are trespassing. We
know that this is not so."
The speaker was a tall blond-headed young man. On his
dungaree jacket he wore an emblem of a white and colored hand
locked in a handshake. His listeners were young people, too[,]
three white and five Negro.
I had followed them on their massive march in silence down
Franklin Street in one of the largest anti-segregation protests
ever staged in the town of Chapel Hill.
The march was minutes over and this small group of nine had
'
T EHLE 183.
,8 Chapel Hill Weekly, Feb. 5, 1964, p. 2, col. 6.
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reconvened on the sidewalk in front of the University Baptist
Church. I moved closer to hear what was said.
"Remember, we are not looking for trouble. We are only
dramatizing the failure of Chapel Hill to insure rights to each of
its citizens. Our only crime is race ....
"The police are not going to hurt you. When they ask you to
leave, you will let your entire body go limp. You will be carried
into a police car and taken to the station...."
"Act like a stick of butter getting ready to melt. You are not
resisting arrest. You are just refusing to assist in your arrest....
You are not alone. It's being done all over Chapel Hill
today .... -49
Two nights later, Fifty more arrests were made as the demon-
strators, after a meeting of the Aldermen, sat down in the main
street intersections to protest the current refusal to enact a public
accommodations law.50
E. The Anti-Picketing Ordinance
Reaction against the street-blocking tactics was immediate, wide-
spread, and almost universally hostile. One manifestation of this
displeasure came two nights after the Saturday demonstrations
when the Board of Aldermen met and enacted a law limiting
picketing. In two paragraphs, the town fathers provided:
Picketing shall be conducted only between the hours of 7:00
a.m. and 7:00 p.m. Picketing at any other time shall be unlaw-
ful and is hereby prohibited.
This amendment shall be in full force and effect on and after
February 10, 1965.
This measure was passed by a four-to-three vote (with Mayor
McClamrock breaking the tie) at the request of Police Chief Blake,
"who stated that he was worried about spreading his force so thin
that they would be unable to prevent possible violence"51 (several
white professors had been assaulted the previous Saturday night
while picketing a beer hall). A scant two hours later, a policeman
told two picketers about the ordinance, and warned them away.
The town reacted against the anti-picketing ordinance just as
it had reacted against the street-blocking incidents. The Ministerial
Association was against it. The Mayor's Human Relations Com-
Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
Durham Morning Herald, Feb. 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 11, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
1965]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mittee was against it. The Committee of Concerned Citizens was
against it. The Daily Tar Heel editorialized that "you do not take
away a man's constitutional right to picket because your police force
is overworked and underpaid-... or because you fear some hood-
lum may attack a picketer."52
By Wednesday, two days later, plans for a test case were com-
plete. The Reverend Charles Jones called Chief Blake to say that
he, another minister, and two long-time women residents of Chapel
Hill were going to test the law by picketing the town hall any time
at the Chief's convenience during the prohibited hours. The Chief
asked Reverend Jones to hold off, and came to the church shortly
with the news that the anti-picketing ordinance was not yet in
effect: an overlooked state law required that all town ordinances
pass by a two-thirds vote, or, failing that, be passed by majority
vote at two successive meetings.
The picketers, reinforced by many others, proceeded to the city
hall for a reading of the first amendment and then resumed nightly
picketing.
The anti-picketing ordinance was not considered at the next
meeting of the Aldermen, and passed into limbo.
53
F. The Easter Week Fast at the Post Office
While the adult Committee of Concerned Citizens continued
peaceful picketing, the student-oriented Chapel Hill Freedom Com-
mittee apparently sensed the community disapproval of its street-
blocking tactics, and quietly, unofficially, but firmly put a mora-
torium on further demonstrations. This moratorium continued
from February 15 with but few exceptions.
One of the exceptions, an exception which regained much of the
community support, was a week-long fast during Easter week on
the small lawn of the post office across from the campus in the heart
of the business block. At first, there was heckling, name-calling,
egg-throwing, protests by a postal employees' union, and even a
cross-burning just outside town by the first regional meeting of the
Ku Klux Klan in several years. The News of Orange County4
carried the rumor that the fasters were eating on the sly. One lady
" d., Feb. 15, 1964, p. 2, col. 2.
" EHLE 195-99.
"' News of Orange County, March 26, 1964, § 1, p. 12, col. 5, quoted
in EHLE 255.
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disapproved because the fasters weren't wearing hats, and others
thought it an unsightly publicity gimmick. But the ladies from the
Concerned Citizens stood by with a leaflet answering the criticism
that the post office lawn was no place for a religious fast :
Jesus was not crucified in a cathedral between two candles but
on a hill between two thieves ... at the kind of place where cynics
talk and thieves curse and soldiers gamble, because that is where
he died, and that is what he died about, and that is where church-
men should be and what churchmen should be about.56
As the days wore by, the simple, sincere message of the quiet,
uneventful fast seemed to reach out. John Dunne, one of the
fasters, told a Daily Tar Heel reporter that "the incidents of kind-
ness have far outnumbered the incidents of name-calling.... People
have stopped to talk to us and encourage us. Some brought ciga-
rettes, blankets and other items. One lady brought us a vase of
flowers."'57  Soon, others followed this example and the concrete
base of the flagpole was clustered with many vases of dogwood, red
bud, and daffodils.
G. The Student Trials
On February 15, the day of the moratorium, another important
event took place. University officials referred the cases of the
student sit-in demonstrators to the student-elected Honor Council
for possible disciplinary action."8
There was no way of knowing how the students on the Honor
Council would react-most of them native to North Carolina, most
of them starting to think about plans after graduation. Earlier,
student body President Mike Lawler (from California) and student
vice-president Bob Spearman (of Chapel Hill) had favored a stu-
dent boycott of all businesses which refused to serve all students;
and this was supported by the student legislature, the student news-
Id. at 246-52.
Id. at 252.
Daily Tar Heel, March 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
The University long ago delegated to the student "court" the power
to discipline (even expel) students who violated the honor code, and this
power has been upheld. In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964),
43 N.C.L. REv. 152. There is a growing doubt, however, that the state
universities have constitutional power to expel students for off-campus
activities unrelated to the primary functions of the educational institutions.
The matter is well-canvassed in a recent article by Duke Professor William
Van Alstyne. See Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 LAw IN
TRANs. Q. 1 (1965).
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paper, and a petition signed by about 1,500 of the 10,000 students.
However, several of the sororities and fraternities held banquets at
the segregated Pines Restaurant (where they were picketed by their
fellow students from the Wesley Foundation), and opponents of
the boycott claimed a petition of fifteen hundred signatures, which
was never released. 9
The charge against the student demonstrators was that they had
violated the Campus Code which requires all students at all times
and places to conduct themselves as "Carolina Gentlemen.""0 After
four hours of deliberating the concept of a Carolina Gentleman, the
student Honor Council acquitted the sit-inners.
The student court first determined that it had jurisdiction over
the off-campus activity ("the Men's Council has definite jurisdiction
over student conduct outside the University itself") ; then it de-
termined that not every violation of a state or federal law is neces-
sarily a violation of the Campus Code ("The most common ex-
ample of this is the driver who drives his car in excess of a speed
limit"); and then concluded:
We must consider the element of timing, or the succession
of events leading to the sit-in demonstrations. Had this non-
violent civil disobedience been the first step in the attempts to
achieve desegregation, the situation would be different. How-
ever, only after countless futile attempts at negotiating and
picketing were made did the sit-ins begin.
Under these circumstances, the actions of the defendant were
held to be well within the bounds of gentlemanly conduct.0 '
This set the pattern for all future cases. A few weeks later,
the Women's Council dismissed charges against two coeds who
had violated the rule against staying out all night without per-
mission. The two girls had been arrested at a sit-in demonstration
and taken to jail. They testified that they had not been allowed
to make any phone calls while in jail and that the late arrival of the
bondsman prevented their notifying the dormitory mother of their
predicament or their arriving back at the dormitory in time. 2
Late in May, there was a third trial when the University of-
ficials referred to the Men's Council the cases of the students who
had been sentenced to jail on the charge of street-blocking. Again
" EHLE 199-200.
"0 See 68 CAROLINA HANDBOOK 112-13 (1964-1965).
1 Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
2Id., March 4, 1964, p. 1, col. 2, p. 3, col. 7.
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the Men's Council held that this conduct was not prohibited to a
"Carolina Gentleman."6 3
H. The Hillsboro Trials
With the mid-February moratorium on demonstrations in
Chapel Hill, interest turned to the trials in Hillsboro, the county
seat. There were two relatively distinct groups of defendants
awaiting trial. The larger group of approximately 250, mostly
University of North Carolina and Chapel Hill students, faced a total
of 1,076 charges of trespass, resisting arrest, obstructing the side-
walk, disorderly conduct, obstructing streets, and related offenses
growing out of the demonstrations. This larger group was repre-
sented by attorneys Floyd B. McKissick, C. C. Malone, Jr., and
Moses C. Burt, Jr.6" The smaller group consisted of five U.N.C.
and Duke University professors, and the members of this group
were represented by Durham attorney Wade Penny, a recent gradu-
ate of the Duke Law School.
1. The Trial of the Professors.-The professors were called to
trial first, on the single charge of "trespass" at Watts' Grill on the
night of January 3. The North Carolina trespass law65 makes it
a misdemeanor for any person "after being forbidden to do so," to
enter upon the lands of another without permission, or to remain
upon the lands of another after being told to leave. The primary
defense by the professors was that only Professor Amon (who had
not been charged because of his head injuries) had entered the
premises, and none of them had been told to leave the parking lot.
Duke math professor David Smith was tried first, in the regular
February term of court before Superior Court Judge J. C. Hall.
The first witness for the state was Mr. Watts, who testified that the
professors had come into his restaurant and refused to leave when
he told them to. On cross examination, Watts denied that he had
used any force, denied any difficulty in controlling his emotions, but
"Durham Morning Herald, May 30, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
"Attorney McKissick of Durham, North Carolina, is the National
President of CORE, and by far the most experienced and well-known of
the three attorneys. He reports that almost without exception the opposing
counsel in his previously scheduled cases (both civil and criminal) denied
him the courtesy of a postponement, and that consequently he was unable
to participate in the Hillsboro demonstration trials.
on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (1953): "If any persons being forbidden to
do so, shall go or enter upon the lands of another, without a license therefor,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. .. ."
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admitted to a series of convictions for trespass (upon the house of
his former wife) and assault, the most recent being about two
weeks earlier.6"
Deputy Sheriff W. E. Clark was the second state's witness.
He testified that the professors were wet and huddled on the
ground in front of the restaurant when he arrived, and that he
arrested them when they refused to leave at the direction of the
proprietor, Mr. Watts. The two Negro policemen who were the
first officers on the scene were not called to testify.6
The defense then put on four professors (two were not under
charge, the other two were Methodist ministers at the Duke School
of Divinity) who testified that Professor Amon entered the restaurant
and was beaten and thrown out, but that none of the other pro-
fessors entered the premises, or were ever told to leave the parking
lot where they were being beaten with brooms and hosed with icy
water when the sheriff arrived."8
The jury apparently believed the testimony of Watts and the
deputy sheriff, for it found Professor Smith guilty of trespass.
Judge Hall sentenced Professor Smith to sixty days of hard labor
on the state roads.
Had this sentence come at a later date, it would have seemed
mild indeed. But at that time the Raleigh News and Observer
called this "Mississippi Justice" and editorialized that:
Wherever the original blame may lie, they are manufacturing
ill-will for North Carolina in the trial of the professors in the
Orange County Superior Court in Hillsboro.
Already in important centers in the North shock and surprise
has been registered as a result of the 60-day sentence given a
young Duke math teacher for joining a group including Negroes
peaceably seeking service at a Chapel Hill cafe.69
The regularly scheduled February term of court then ended,
and Judge Hall went elsewhere. A special term of court was called,
and this time Judge Raymond B. Mallard presided. (The North
Carolina judges ride circuit.)
The trials of the professors for trespass at the Watts Grill
continued, and ultimately all were convicted. Judge Mallard called
e EnLE 217-18.67Id. at 218.8Id. at 219-25.
"Reprinted in the Daily Tar Heel, March 12, 1964, p. 2, col. 1.
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three of them for sentencing and asked if they would again violate
the trespass law.
Professor Herzog replied: "I acted in obedience to God as God
gave me light to understand. I wanted to bear witness to the
equality of all men before God and their fellow men." Judge
Mallard asked a second time if he would again violate the trespass
law. Professor Herzog replied: "I have done it once, and I have
seen the consequences. I cannot again do the same." Judge Mal-
lard sentenced him to a fine of fifty dollars and court costs."
Professor Wynn was asked the same questions and replied
that he thought he had "exercised the best judgment... and shown
the most responsibility to Christian and democratic traditions,"
that he had violated the trespass law as "an act of persuasion of
the last resort in an attempt to change the law." Judge Mallard
sentenced him to ninety days. 1
Professor Osborn answered the Judge's questions with the
comment that "If the circumstances arose again in which my
conscience before God conflicted with the trespass law of the state-
and I don't think it will-I don't think I could do otherwise."
Judge Mallard sentenced him to ninety days."
Professor Herzog, the only one to escape with a fine, felt the
worst. He wept outside the courtroom, feeling that the Judge had
misunderstood his replies as a "recantation," whereas he had only
intended to say that the courtroom hardship was so detrimental
to his work and emotional well-being that he probably would never
disobey another law.78
2. The Contempts of Court.-As these sentences indicate,
Judge Mallard is known as a hard judge, a stickler for the letter
of the law. One widely circulated rumor has it that the Judge
once sentenced and fined himself for contempt of court when he was
a few minutes late in arriving at the bench.
When the special term opened, Judge Mallard was true to form.
He made it clear that certain rules would be followed strictly, all
of them enforced by the sheriff and his deputies. There was to be
no reading ("This is not a reading room"), no eating or drinking
("This is not a lunchroom"), no talking or laughing ("This is a
" Chapel Hill Weekly, March 22, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
" EHLE 242.
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ourt of law"). Later, to the consternation of a woman spectator
who happened in, there was a rule against knitting as well. More-
over, all defendants were required to be in the courtroom at all
times.74
Several of the defendants felt the wrath of these orders. On
one occasion, Professor Klopfer, when his jury had retired for
deliberation, left the courtroom and went to the clerk's office to
make a few notes. Judge Mallard promptly ordered his bond
forfeited. The stunned defendant returned at once and told the
judge that he had been given permission on the previous day to
work in the clerk's office, and had assumed this permission still
held. Judge Mallard denied this, but did order the forfeiture of
bond stricken. 5
Professor Wynn also got into trouble. His jury had been out
for about an hour, the lunch period was nigh, no business was going
on, and Wynn picked up a newspaper left near the defense table by
some court attach6. Judge Mallard saw what was going on and
immediately charged the professor with "'contemptuously and in-
solently reading a newspaper in the courtroom' during the trial." 8
"The students learned this lesson early. On the first day of the first
trial, judge Hall presiding, the solicitor called the roll of all the defendants.
Twenty of them were on the porch of the courthouse, they entered when
they were informed they were wanted inside, but were fined $5.00 each.
Ben Spaulding, nineteen-year-old Negro treasurer of the Chapel Hill Free-
dom Committee wrote a check for $80.00 to cover the fines. A third party
authorized to write checks had made a recent withdrawal, and the bank
account at that time was $79.52-forty-eight cents short of the $80.00 fine.
The check was not honored, Spaulding was indicted by the grand jury for
writing a bad check, and was sentenced by Judge Mallard to serve four
months in jail, suspended for five years. Daily Tar Heel, March 21, 1964,
p. 1, col. 8.
7 5 EHLE 232.
Daily Tar Heel, March 8, 1964, p. 1, col. 6. A trial judge is authorized
by the Constitution to punish summarily for contempt "where immediate
punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority'
before the public." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948). A recent
example of this is Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964), where a witness
refused to answer questions when so directed by the judge and said: "I am
being coerced and intimidated and badgered. The Court is suppressing the
evidence." Id. at 580. If the alleged contempt is a personal attack on the
judge, as in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), or if the judge is
personally embroiled in the contemptuous conduct, as in Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), or if the judge has a financial interest in the
outcome of the suit, as in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), or if the
contempt is not in open court but in camnera proceedings, as in In re Murchi-
son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), or where there is "bias, or such a likelihood of
bias or an appearance of bias that the judge . . . [is] unable to hold the
balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of
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The judge fined the professor ten dollars.
i The third "contempt" was against Gary Blanchard, the co-
editor of the student Daily Tar Heel. Earlier, the Tar Heel had
protested the judge's rule against studying while in forced at-
tendance in the courtroom, and ended the editorial with this para-
graph: "After several hours of this iron-hard courtroom discipline,
you begin to get an idiotic urge to stand, stretch, yawn, and say to
Judge Mallard something like, 'Well, I've had enough of this
nonsense. I'm going home.' "7
Blanchard had covered the demonstration at the Watts' Grill
for the Tar Heel, and testified on behalf of the Duke professors in
regard to the "trespass" that he had been present and had not heard
Mr. Watts order the professors to leave his property. On cross-
examination, Solicitor Thomas Cooper attempted to attack the
credibility of Blanchard by asking him about the earlier Tar Heel
editorial:
Question: Mr. Blanchard, do you feel this court is nonsense?
Answer: No, sir, I do not.
Question: Do you feel, sir, that the Court's action in attempting
to keep order and to keep the courtroom quiet for its
business, is nonsense?
Answer: Some of the restrictions imposed to ensure the end of
orderly justice, to which all of us agree, I did feel to
be nonsensical. 78
Blanchard was allowed to step down at this point, and nothing
was said. At the end of the day, however, Judge Mallard called
Blanchard to the bench and told him to come back the next day
and "show cause" why he should not be cited "for direct contempt
expressed in testimony under oath in court which tends to discredit
this court. 71 9
the accused," Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964), the Constitution
requires the judge to disqualify himself from the contempt proceedings.
Otherwise, the trial judges can preside over the contempts committed in
their presence, for the Supreme Court will not "assume that judges are so
irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with
resistance to their authority.. . ." Id. at 584.
Daily Tar Heel, March 7, 1964, p. 2, col. 2.
Raleigh News and Observer, March 11, 1964, p. 4, col. 2.
, Id., March 19, 1964, p. 2, col. 2. It is now well-established that out-
of-court statements by litigants, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941),
by newspapers, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and by attorneys for litigants, In re Sawyer,
360 U.S. 622 (1959), are protected by the first amendment from judicial
punishment, no matter how false, how defamatory the statements may be.
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Blanchard returned the next day with Barry Winston, a young
attorney from Chapel Hill. For the first time since the trials
started, reporters from the major state newspapers and television
stations were present. "The word had evidently gone out that a
newspaperman was in trouble in Hillsboro."8
Attorney Winston asked the judge to dismiss the contempt
charges, pointing out that Blanchard had no choice but to answer as
he had: if he refused to answer, he would be in contempt; if he lied,
he would be guilty of perjury and contempt; his answer was the
only one possible, and, referring as it did to the earlier editorial, fell
within the protection of first amendment freedom of press.
The judge skirted around the issue. He ruled that the Blanchard
testimony was "considered contemptuous" but that owing to a
number of circumstances including "the apparent immaturity of the
respondent, the court takes no further action and respondent is
discharged."81
3. The Removal to Federal Court.-The Chapel Hill defen-
dants grew restless as they attended each day of the professors' trials,
and became distressed by what they saw. In a surprise move, the
attorneys for the student defendants removed 730 demonstration
A recent illustration of this is Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), which
started when the three superior court judges of Bibb County, Georgia,
charged a grand jury that it should look into allegations that elected officials
had "bought" a "Negro block vote." This charge to the jury was issued
before invited representatives of the press, and the obvious target was
Sheriff Wood. The sheriff immediately called a press conference of his
own where he attacked the judges in no uncertain terms: calling the grand
jury investigation "race agitation" and comparing the judges with the Ku
Klux Klan. The sheriff personally carried a copy of his press release to the
grand jury room where it was delivered to the grand jurors. Mr. Justice
Harlan described this as action by "a member of its official entourage who
has scandalized the conduct of the court in relation to and during the course
of a pending judicial proceeding. . . ." Id. at 395. The press release had
been issued from the sheriff's office in the courthouse, and the subsequent
contempt citation charged that its language "imputed lack of judicial
integrity to the three judges" and "'created . . . a clear, present and
imminent danger to the investigation being conducted . . . and . . . to
the proper administration of justice in Bibb Superior Court'." Id. at 381.
The sheriff was adjudged guilty of contempt, and his conviction was affirmed
by the Georgia courts. But the Supreme Court reversed the conviction as
an abridgement of the sheriff's liberty of free expression. The Court con-
cluded that the sheriff's conduct "did not present a danger to the ad-
ministration of justice . . . " id. at 395, and that the naked conclusion of
the Georgia judges that it had this "tendency" did not make it so. The
above Supreme Court decisions are slender reeds indeed if they can be
circumvented by the route utilized against editor Gary Blanchard.8 ELE 236.
81Daily Tar Heel, March 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
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charges for trial to the federal district court in Greensboro. This
was done pursuant to a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 186682
which authorizes the removal of any state criminal prosecution un-
der either of two circumstances: first, when the criminal prosecution
is brought against a person "who is denied or cannot enforce in
the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States. . . ," or, second,
when the state criminal prosecution results from "any act under
color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights ......
Superior Court Judge Mallard was obviously angry and termed
the removal petition a "false and scurrilous attack upon every court
in North Carolina and upon the Supreme Court as well."'8 3
Solicitor Thomas D. Cooper, Jr., immediately filed a motion in
the federal court to remand the cases back to the state court.
North Carolina Assistant Attorney General Ralph Moody joined
with Solicitor Cooper in this motion to remand and argued that
there was no statute in North Carolina which prohibited a fair
trial and that the trespass laws under which the defendants were
charged "are neutral and applicable to both white and colored.", 4
On March 20, Federal District Judge Edwin M. Stanley sent
the cases of the 217 student demonstrators back to the state court
in Hillsboro for trial. He ruled that he would "not presume that
the courts of the state will not decide constitutional questions in
harmony with the United States Supreme Court's determination
of the Federal Constitution" and that "since no discriminatory state
statutes or constitutional provisions are claimed, it is abundantly
clear that the petitioners must look to the state courts for the
protection of any rights they may have under the Constitution and
laws of the United States." 5
4. The Nolo Contendere Pleas.-When the cases were returned
for trial to the North Carolina Superior Court in Hillsboro, there
was another surprise. The approximate 117 defendants involved
in the street sit-down of February 7 threw themselves on the mercy
of the Court by pleading nolo contendere to the charge of blocking
the highway and to the related charge of resisting arrest. This plea
8' 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1959).
Daily Tar Heel, March 14, 1964, p. 3, col. 6.Chapel Hill Weekly, March 18, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.85Id., March 22, 1964, p. 1, col. 8.
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(from the Latin, "I will not contest") has much the same effect as
a plea of "guilty" in so far as sentencing is concerned, but unlike a
plea of guilty the nolo contendere plea may not be used as an ad-
mission in other proceedings elsewhere. Solicitor Cooper agreed
to nolle prosse or refrain from prosecuting the approximate 700
trespass and other resisting arrest charges against these 117 de-
fendants, "with leave," however, to change his mind on this matter
and reopen the proceedings.
s °
There is no sure explanation for this nolo contendere plea. Had
each individual defendant insisted upon his right to a jury trial on
the hundreds of charges, the court proceedings would have gone
on for many weeks, if not months, at great expense to the state
and to the defendants.
When the federal judge remanded the cases back to the state
court in Hillsboro for trial, the News of Orange County commented
on "the slow course of the 1,200 cases yet pending trial," and said:
"It is known that discussions are going on at a decision-making
level as to the possibility of speedier disposition."87  Attorneys for
the student defendants publicly denied that there had been a
"deal." However, the students told novelist John Ehle that the
decision to plead nolo contendere had been made at a packed meet-
ing of all those charged with street-blocking, on the understanding
(from their attorneys) that if they pleaded nolo contendere, and
showed penitence, only a few leaders would go to jail on sentences
of not more than ninety days; the others would be let off with a
harsh scolding and suspended sentences. All charges except for
the single charge of "street-blocking," so the students understood,
would be dropped by the District Solicitor. 8
5. The Sentences.-The university community of Chapel Hill
has long felt it necessary to punish "street-blocking." In Book 2 at
page 145 of the Chapel Hill Ordinances it is made unlawful to
"obstruct a public street or highway.., in such a manner as to de-
lay, impede and hinder the free passage of the public along and over
said highway." Violation of this ordinance is punishable by a fine
of fifty dollars or by confinement up to thirty days.
Unlike the Aldermen in Chapel Hill, the North Carolina legis-
lature had never before felt it necessary to punish street-blocking
86Id., April 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 7.
Quoted in EHTLE 266.
18Id. at 265.
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as such. The North Carolina legislature had deemed it necessary
to prohibit and punish the use of profane or indecent language on
the highway;9 to make it unlawful for any person to place glass or
injurious obstructions on the highway,"° or to obstruct highway
drains;91 but there was no general prohibition against blocking
highways. The only such provision was limited in operation.
Entitled "Obstructing way to places of public worship," it makes
it a misdemeanor for any person to "stop up or obstruct the way
leading to any place of public worship, or to any spring or well
commonly used by the congregation."92  The legislature has now
seen fit, however, to prohibit sitting or lying upon highways or
streets.
93
The grand jury indictments against the Chapel Hill demon-
strators were verbatim copies of the Chapel Hill ordinance, and in
many cases the indictments referred to their source, Book 2, Page
145 of the Chapel Hill Ordinances. In short, the only relevant
offense was that made unlawful by Chapel Hill ordinance, the
demonstrators were charged by the grand jury with violating this
ordinance, and the maximum penalty permitted by this ordinance
was thirty days in jail. The demonstrators were not risking much
when they pleaded nolo contendere.94
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (Supp. 1963).
0oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-91 (1964).1N.C GEN. STAT. § 136-92 (1964).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-199 (1953). A similar provision is found in the
statutes dealing with roads and highways. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-90 (1965)
makes it unlawful for any person to obstruct "any highway, cartway, mill
road or road leading to and from any church or other place of public worship.
." The section makes it unlawful for any person "to hinder or in any
manner interfere with the making of any road or cartway laid off according
to law."
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-174.1 (1965 Advance Legislative Service No.
2), which provides: "(a) No person shall willfully stand, sit, or lie upon
the highway or street in such a manner as to impede the regular flow of
traffic. (b) Any person convicted of violating this section shall be punished
by fine or imprisonment, or both in the discretion of the court." Cf. Garner
v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), where the amendment of the trespass
law was an indication "that the Louisiana trespass statute in force at the
time of the petitioners' arrests would probably not have applied to these
facts." Id. at 164 n.11.
' It is well-established constitutional law that when a grand jury returns
an indictment the defendant can only be found guilty of the charge made,
otherwise the grand jury is put to naught. "Conviction upon a charge not
made would be sheer denial of due process." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 362 (1937). "No principle of procedural due process is more
clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to
be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among
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But they might have had second thought when they heard
about the speech Judge Mallard gave to the Future Farmers of
America. During an overnight court recess, the Judge saw fit to
discuss the pending Chapel Hill cases publicly, and, as the Greens-
boro Daily News saw it, "straight from the hip." Judge Mallard
told his young audience that the "alien in North Carolina," with
"Yankee money," is feeding young Tar Heels a "bill of goods."
According to the news story, he went on to say that the demon-
strators "lying down in Chapel Hill streets" had been sent from
the north and that "they were paid $6 per day from northern
funds."95
The penniless demonstrators, practically all life-time residents
of Chapel Hill or students at the University there, were apprehen-
sive that the Judge should speak thus prior to sentencing, and their
apprehension deepened when the Judge told one young demon-
strator that he was serving the cause of an "international con-
spiracy."96
Although all the demonstrators were equally guilty of the
charge to which they pleaded nolo contendere, the Judge was lenient
with the Negro demonstrators; only one received an active jail
sentence, and he had been described by the County Solicitor as
"the ramrod." 7  The Judge was lenient with the girl demon-
strators; only one received an active jail sentence, and she had been
described by the District Solicitor as from California.9" The
Judge was not lenient on the young white men who had been
leaders in the demonstrations.
the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all
courts, state or federal." Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948). In
the Cole case, the defendants had been indicted for violation of § 2 of a
statute and sent to jail for violation of § 1 of that statute. The Supreme
Court reversed with the comment that "it is as much a violation of due
process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on
which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that
was never made." 333 U.S. at 201.
" Greensboro Daily News, April 21, 1964, p. 4A, col. 7, quoted in
EHLE 271.
"' After the sentencing, John Dunne wrote a letter home complaining
that Judge Mallard did not "lecture us about our lack of responsibility"
or "about the wrongness of civil disobedience as a method" (all of which
Dunne thought debatable). "Instead," continued the letter, "he spoke in the
incredibly ignorant and guilt-ridden words of the Klan, that we are all
pawns or malicious agents of 'the international conspiracy,' that we were
all paid $6.00 a day by Northern funds." Id. at 279.
97 Id. at 273.
08 Id. at 271.
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John Dunne, the co-chairman of the Chapel Hill Freedom
Committee, is a mystery to some whites who reason that other
whites go into the integration movement because they are unsuc-
cessful in their own society. Dunne is a native of Ohio and a
graduate of the Choate prep school in Connecticut. There, he was
awarded the School Seal Award for leadership, was voted the
outstanding musician in his class (violin), was a star fullback on
the football team, and was awarded the Joseph P. Kennedy Me-
morial Scholarship. He entered the University of North Carolina
with one of the prized Morehead Scholarships, 99 and was an honor
student until he dropped out in his senior year to give full time
to the local integration activities. Judge Mallard sentenced him
to twelve months in jail on the charge of obstructing traffic and to
two years in jail on the charge of resisting arrest: the two-year
sentence, however, to issue "upon further orders of the court at any
time in the next five years."' 0
Pat Cusick, another of the Freedom Committee leaders, was
born and raised in Gadsden, Alabama, where his great-grandfather
had founded the Ku Klux Klan. He attended a Catholic boarding
school in Alabama where he was taught that segregation was
morally wrong. At the University, he was active in the Student
Peace Union0 and, one course short of a B.S. degree in mathe-
matics, dropped out of the University to give full time to the Chapel
Hill Freedom Committee. Judge Mallard sentenced him to a term
of twelve months in jail on the charge of obstructing traffic and to
a term of two years in jail on the charge of resisting arrest. The
two-year jail sentence was suspended for a period of five years with
the condition that Cusick not engage in or be a part of, or physically
associate with any demonstrations or physically accompany any
person or persons engaged in any demonstrations for any cause,
on any public street, highway, or sidewalk, or any other public
place in North Carolina.'02
Lou Calhoun was also a senior at the University of North Caro-
lina. Born in Alabama and reared in Tennessee, he was a Golden
Gloves boxing champion. At the University, he worked his way
through as a waiter and had headed the Methodist Wesley Founda-
00 Id. at 4.
"00 Chapel Hill Weekly, April 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 7.
101 EHLE 6-8.
102 Chapel Hill Weekly, April 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 7.
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tion.103 Judge Mallard sentenced him to six months in prison, the
sentence to start when Calhoun graduated from college.' 0 4  So it
went. J. V. Henry, a recent graduate from the University and a
native of Asheville, received the same sentence as Dunne-twelve
months in jail and a fine of 150 dollars. Buddy Tieger, a former
Angier B. Duke Scholar and recent graduate of Duke University,
was sentenced to a year in jail and a fine of 250 dollars. Quinton
Baker, the only Negro to go to jail, was sentenced to six months
and a fine of 150 dollars, the jail sentence to commence upon his
graduation from North Carolina College in Durham. Rosemary
Ezra, the first Jewess ever to enter the Women's Prison, was
sentenced to six months and fined 500 dollars for obstructing traf-
fic.10
5
The rank-and-file defendants received jail sentences ranging
in severity from twelve months to ten days. These sentences were
suspended, however, with "probations carrying absolute prohibi-
tions against participation in any public demonstrations.' ' 0
Judge Mallard's sentences stripped the Chapel Hill Freedom
Committee of its leaders (who were sent to jail) and of its followers
(who were prohibited from any public demonstration for any
cause). And the Chapel Hill Freedom Committee was deeply in
debt.
The jail sentences were suspended, in part, on the condition
that each defendant pay his court costs, which were assessed at
around 81 dollars. With over 100 such defendants, this was quite
a sum for the students to pay. Moreover, there were many fines
levied, ranging from a low of fifty to a high of 500 dollars. And
there were expenses of "bonding" which had to be met: upon
arrest, there was a bond of 175 dollars to ensure appearance before
the Chapel Hill Recorder's Court; when the cases were transferred
to the superior court in Hillsboro (as they all were), there was an
additional bond of another 175 dollars to ensure appearances there.
The total bonding fees exceeded 7,500 dollars; and the out-of-
pocket expenses for court costs and court fines were even larger.
o.EHLE 14.
104 Chapel Hill Weekly, April 26, 1964, p. 1, col. 7.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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L Conclusion
What, if anything, was gained by this heavy expenditure of
money, of time in jail, of disruption to the normal community ac-
tivities? Not a single restaurant, cafe, or motel which refused
to serve Negroes when the demonstrations began in December had
changed its policies when the Chapel Hill Freedom Committee
was broken in April. There was some slight shift in the opposite
direction. A radio repair shop refused to accept former Negro
customers; and a downtown florist refused to sell flowers to student
leaders who advocated a student boycott of segregated businesses." °7
But there was something on the credit side. Freedom Com-
mittee leaders speak of a newly-developed spirit in the Negro com-
munity, a spirit of confidence, of energy, of determination. And
they point to voter registration in the Negro wards, up fifty per
cent and more over the level when the December demonstrations
began.
And the demonstrations reached the conscience of the white
community, or at least some of its members. The mother of one of
the demonstrators put it this way:
On Sunday night, Dec. 19, at midnight an official of the
University of North Carolina called to tell me my son was in the
Chapel Hill jail....
He explained that a group of Negro and white youths entered a
restaurant which does not serve Negroes. They were refused
service, ordered out, but would not leave....
I knew about demonstrations, arrests for trespassing and resisting
arrest, for Greensboro has been a center of Negro protests.
The Negroes-yes, but my boy is white. He can eat any-
where, with anyone, except Negroes. What was his cause?...
I went back to bed-to get warm, to hide and cry in the dark.
"Charles is in jail in Chapel Hill," I explained the call to his
father....
"You mean he doesn't want to get out," I cried when the
officer said Charles was among those refusing bail.
Charles did get out for Christmas. We didn't bail him out,
belittle his efforts or his actions. I wanted to tell him to pursue
his studies and forget the cause. To educate a son is an expensive
process and we just cannot finance "the cause." I wanted to tell
him he would lose friends by participating in the movement. I
wanted to tell him he should take the middle of the road as we
have done. But when it came time I couldn't say anything.
10, Daily Tar Heel, March 11, 1964, p. 1, col. 7.
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Charles has returned to Chapel Hill and was in jail again on
New Year's Eve. Again I wondered if he was warm, hungry,
uncomfortable.... I was very sad and yet proud.
Even I am beginning to wonder if there really is some other
way. Maybe he is right. I grew up in a little town down next to
the South Carolina line and Negroes to my people were always
just "niggers."
But Charles is a generation apart and maybe his mother's
attitudes are dead wrong. Maybe I am just beginning to under-
stand. 108
The Chapel Hill demonstrators did not persuade the Chapel Hill
Aldermen to enact a local public accommodations law; but these
demonstrators, with thousands of others in hundreds of similar
demonstrations throughout the South took their case, as the Chapel
Hill Weekly urged, "to higher authority. '" 0  On July 2, 1964,
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964110 into law.
That law makes it unlawful for the Pines, the Rock Pile, the Watts
Grill, and all other restaurants and motels in Chapel Hill, in North
Carolina, and throughout the country to discriminate in service on
the basis of race."1 This, then, is the due of the demonstrators.
I. Addenda
On July 3, several of the Chapel Hill youngsters decided to
"test" the effectiveness of the federal law. They went to Brady's
Restaurant and were served. They went to Watts Grill and were
denied service. One of them asked why Mr. Watts did not comply
with the Civil Rights Act, and as he later told it, "Austin Watts
hit him hard in the jaw with his fist." He may have been hit a
second time before hitting the floor. "By this time, there were
fifteen or twenty people there.., and they started slugging others
in our group. We went for our cars and a woman stuck a butcher
knife into the window of the car I was in and said, 'I'm going to
kill all you niggers and nigger lovers.' " Charges of assault were
filed against Mr. Watts, he was found guilty in the Chapel Hill
Recorder's Court, and Judge Jim Phipps laid upon him the penalty
of ten dollars and forty cents court costs." 2
... Id., Jan. 7, 1964, p. 3, cols. 5-8.
... See text accompanying note 38 supra.
11078 Stat. 241.
... See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
.. EHLE 293-94.
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The next day, Independence Day, July 4, the Reverend Charles
Jones led a team of interracial groups into all the segregated restau-
rants, including Watts, and received service. By noon they could
report the integration of just about all the places of public accom-
modations in Chapel Hill. 13
In August, 1964, the students jailed by Judge Mallard in April
were paroled from prison. John Dunne received a scholarship
from Harvard College to complete his senior year. Quinton Baker
received a similar scholarship from the University of Wisconsin.
Buddy Tieger received a fellowship from Brandeis University for
graduate study. Lou Calhoun was paroled to the Christian Associ-
ation in Philadelphia to work (as he had in the past) as a counselor
at a camp for the disadvantaged youngsters. Pat Cusick went to
Boston to work in a "poverty program.""1 4
In early December, 1964, Governor Sanford commuted the
sentences and fines of all Chapel Hill demonstrators then appealing
their convictions. This included the professors who had partici-
pated in the January 3 demonstrations at the Watts Grill.""
In mid-December, 1964, the Commissioners of Orange County
adopted the following resolution: "We ... do hereby commend
Judge Raymond B. Mallard for his devotion to his judicial duties
and for (his) learned and impartial manner.., and for his deep
knowledge of humanity as shown by judgments rendered, all in the
highest tradition of the administration of justice in the state of
North Carolina."'1 6
In late December, 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States
freed all demonstrators in a ruling that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was effective retroactively." 7 As John Ehle put it, "This did away
with hundreds of charges against Chapel Hill demonstrators and
complicated to near-distraction the debate about who all along had
indeed been on the side of law and who against it."" 8
II. THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
Solutions to the legal problems arising out of the Chapel Hill
demonstrations, like the similar legal problems arising out of the
113 Id. at 293.
1
, Id. at 310, 311.
" Id. at 337.
" id. at 338.
"1 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Blow v. North
Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965).
118 E.EL 337.
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new student demonstrations generally, are at best unsettled. The
tactics are new, the conflicting societal interests must be balanced
in a novel environment. Precedents are few; abstract reasoning of
necessity is colored by the viewpoint of the speaker. It follows
that the conclusions drawn below are tentative and conjectural.
A. Resisting Arrest by "'Going Limp"
The student demonstrators typically "sat in" at the segregated
restaurants, and when the police arrived, "went limp" and had to
be carried by the policeman to the waiting police cars." 9 The
students denied that they were "resisting" arrest; they claimed that
they were merely refusing to assist in their arrest. Nevertheless,
each demonstrator who "went limp" was charged under General
Statutes section 14-223 which provides that: "If any person shall
wilfully and unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in
discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.""
There are very few North Carolina reported decisions constru-
ing this statute. Most of them go to form rather than substance,
and construe the statute closely, and in favor of the defendants.'
State v. Estes, 2' however, provides guidelines. There, a state
... See, e.g., text accompanying note 49 supra.
"
2
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1953).
21. Most of the recently decided cases dismiss the indictments because of
error in form. See, e.g., State v. Dunston, 256 N.C. 203, 123 S.E.2d 480(1962); State v. Scott, 241 N.C. 178, 84 S.E.2d 654 (1954); State v.
Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954); State v. Raynor, 235 N.C.
184, 69 S.E.2d 155 (1952). Other states also have construed comparable
statutes in favor of the defendants. In Cooksey v. State, 84 Ark. 485, 106
S.W. 694 (1907), the city marshal testified that he had told Cooksey to go
to court to pay a fee, but that Cooksey refused and that
the next time I saw him he was in the butcher shop, and I went in
there and told him he hadn't gone, and that he must go, and he said I
couldn't carry him, and I told him he was too large for me to "tote." ...
Later in the evening he came and sat down by the blacksmith shop, and
I walked up and said to him, "Mr. Cooksey, you must go down to the
court with me," and he said, "All right, I will go up and appear, but I
don't want you to go with me," and I said, "All right." He then got
up and went to court.
Id. at 486-87, 106 S.W. at 674-75. The jury convicted on this evidence,
but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed: "There was no evidence of an
attempt to arrest appellant, and consequently there was no resistance or an
obstruction to an arrest. The officer's effort seems to have been to persuade
him to go of his own volition to court, and he finally agreed and did go."
Id. at 487. 106 S.W. at 675.
1- 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581 (1923).
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health officer testified that he went to the defendant's store in
Granite Falls, shook hands with him, and said:
"I find you have not complied with the law with regard to
your toilet"; that the defendant cursed him, and replied, "I don't
want you to follow me another inch"; that the witness rejoined,
"It is the law..."; that defendant again cursed him, and the
witness asked whether the defendant meant to obstruct him as
a public officer, and the defendant said that was exactly what he
meant; that the witness then started out, and the defendant used
obscene language....
"Defendant at no time rose from his desk and did not strike or
offer to strike me. He made no demonstration of violence what-
ever."
123
The defendant was charged with violation of a statute which
provides that "Any person or persons who willfully interfere with
or obstruct the officers of the State Board of Health in the dis-
charge of any of the aforementioned duties shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor .... "" The trial judge, after hearing the above
testimony, directed the jury to find the defendant guilty if they
believed the testimony to be true. The jury convicted. The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held:
In the present case there was no force or violence; but if the
jury should find from the evidence that the defendant at the time
used language or was guilty of conduct which was calculated and
intended to put the officer in fear or to intimidate or impede him
as a man of ordinary firmness in the present discharge of his
official duties and did thereby hinder or impede him, the de-
fendant would be guilty. These, however, are questions of fact
for determination by the jury, and not inferences of law for the
decision of the court.1 25
In short, a defendant does not "willfully interfere with or obstruct"
an officer unless he impedes an officer "of ordinary firmness in the
present discharge of his official duties."
Decisions from other jurisdictions add flesh to this bare-bones
legal definition.120
281 Id. at 753, 117 S.E. at 581.
121 Id. at 754, 117 S.E. at 582. (Citation omitted.)
1 Id. at 755, 117 S.E. at 583.
... Despard v. Wilcox, 102 L.T.N.X. 103 (1910), is an English case with
only surface relevance. There, a large group of suffragettes from The
Women's Freedom League assembled in front of No. 10 Downing Street
to deliver a petition to the Prime Minister. An even larger group of
spectators gathered around, thereby blocking the street. The women were
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In Charge To Grand Jury,2 7 Circuit Judge Curtis explained
to the jurors a federal statute making it unlawful to "obstruct,
resist, or oppose" the federal officials. Hundreds of Boston citizens
had stood shoulder to shoulder to prevent federal marshals from
executing warrants under the Fugitive Slave Act. 2 ' The judge
explained that:
[I]f a multitude of persons should assemble, even in a public
highway, with the design to stand together and thus prevent the
officer from passing freely along the way... and the officer
should thus be hindered or obstructed, this would, of itself, and
without any active violence, be such an obstruction as is con-
templated by this law. If to this be added, use of any active
violence, then the officer is not only obstructed, but he is
resisted and opposed .... 129
In short, "to obstruct" is to prevent and frustrate the execution of
the police obligation; to "resist and oppose" contemplates active
violent obstruction.
District Judge Dyer gave a similar construction to the federal
statute in United States v. McDonald.13 0 He charged the jury that:
The words of the statute are, "obstructs, resists or opposes
any officer of the United States." Resistance to an officer is to
oppose him by direct, active and more or less forcible means. It
means something more than to hinder, or interrupt, or prevent,
or baffle, or circumvent. The gist of the offense of resisting is
personal resistance of the officer... by direct, active, and in some
degree forcible means.' 31
The court then added that the statute also includes "willful acts
of obstruction or opposition" and that
to obstruct is to interpose obstacles or impediments, to hinder,
impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent, and the term
does not necessarily imply the employment of direct force, or the
exercise of direct means. It includes any passive, indirect or
arrested and convicted of violating two statutes. One required the police to
keep Downing Street free from congestion, the other made it unlawful to
obstruct the police in the performance of their duty. As the women did
not in any way resist the arrest, the basis of the conviction in reality was
"street blocking" rather than obstructing the police.
30 Fed. Cas. 983 (No. 18,250) (D. Mass. 1854).
1209 Stat. 482 (1850).
'2' 30 Fed. Cas. at 984. (Emphasis added.)
130 26 Fed. Cas. 1074 (No. 15,667) (E.D. Wis. 1879).1
"
1Id. at 1076-77.
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circuitous impediments... such as hindering or preventing an
officer by not opening a door or removing an obstacle or con-
cealing or removing property.18 2
More current federal decisions are even more demanding in
their requirement that there be an overt, active, and more or less
forcible hindrance. In Long v. United States,1 33 federal officials
had a warrant for the arrest of one Carl Ballard. They went to
the home of Long (where they believed Ballard to be hiding) and
knocked on the door. Long delayed in opening the door, and when
he did, denied that Ballard was there. The officers then searched
the house and found Ballard hiding in the attic. Long was tried
under a federal statute' which punishes whoever "forcibly assaults,
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes" with the per-
formance of official duties by federal officers. The trial court in-
structed the jury that it could find Long guilty if it found that Long
had attempted to mislead the officer or had delayed in opening the
door. The Fourth Circuit (per Chief Judge Parker) reversed the
conviction and held that the "resisting" statute did not apply unless
there was "some use of force or threat to use it or display of force
in such a way as to intimidate or interfere with the officer .... ""
Miller v. United States38 arose in a similar factual context.
Federal marshals had a subpoena to serve on Richard Morris
(wanted as a witness in a bankrobbing case) and went to the house
of Evelyn Miller, his cousin. The marshals saw the wanted man
in the back yard, knocked on the front door and demanded entrance.
Miss Miller would not let them in without a search warrant, and
told them that Morris was not there. The officers then separated,
one kept watch on the house, the other obtained an arrest warrant,
and within a few hours they captured Morris in the home of
Evelyn Miller.
Miller was then indicted and convicted under a statute which
punishes "whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or
opposes any officer of the United States. .. in serving... any legal
... process."' 137 The Fifth Circuit (per Judge Brown) reversed the
conviction. It said that there was no resisting, obstructing, or
... Id. at 1077.
199 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1952).18 U.S.C. § 111 (1958).
131 199 F.2d at 719.
133 230 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1956).
187 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1958).
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opposing the officers when Miller gave them information which
she and the officers knew to be false. There was "an irritation and
an annoyance" but no more because the lie "did not deflect the
officers from their conviction that Morris was in the house and
their determination to wait him out or enter after him once the
Warrant of Arrest was received."' 38
In District of Columbia v. Little'39 the homeowner was con-
victed at the trial court under a statute which made it unlawful to
interfere with or prevent any inspection by a health officer. 4 ' A
health officer had received a complaint about the home of Geraldine
Little, and went there to inspect. Little refused to unlock the door
so he could enter, and remonstrated against his attempts to enter
without a search warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and held that
even if the Health Officer had a lawful right to inspect the
premises without a warrant, we are persuaded that respondent's
statements to the officer were not an "interference" that made her
guilty of a misdemeanor under the controlling district law....
[M]ere remonstrances or even criticisms of an officer are not
usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference....
The word "interfere"... cannot fairly be interpreted to encom-
pass respondent's failure to unlock her door .... 41
The Court pointed out that "Had the respondent not objected to
the officer's entry of her house without a search warrant, she might
hereby have waived her constitutional objections."'142
The decisions by the state supreme courts also indicate that
mere passive conduct which does not in fact frustrate the officers
in the performance of their duty does not come within the scope of
the normal "resisting" arrest statute.
In People v. Pilkington'43 the defendant advised some friends
being arrested "to keep their mouths shut, and that a lawyer would
be soon on the way." The New York court held that this did not
" 230 F.2d at 489.
13 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
... Commissioners' Regulations Concerning the Use and Occupancy of
Buildings and Grounds, promulgated April 22, 1897, amended July 28, 1922,
quoted in District of Columbia v. Little, supra note 139, at 4-5 n.2.
' '339 U.S. at 4, 6-7.
"' In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Supreme Court held
that the concept of the fourth amendment did not preclude the state from
punishing a householder for denying entrance to a health officer even though
the health officer lacked a search warrant.
1'3 103 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Broome County Ct. 1951).
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"harm, obstruct, or resist any officer ... in the performance of any
duty"; and that the "right of free speech.. . shall [not] be denied
... [a] citizen in order to cast a perfect calm over the... officer
making an arrest."'1 4
State v. Scott'4 5 arose from a charge to the jury that if one told
an officer that "he would not be arrested and would die first" he
would be resisting the officer. The Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction under the statute which makes it unlawful
"to oppose, resist or assault any officer.. ,,."" The Court ex-
plained that "If an officer is deterred from making the arrest by
the mere announcement of an intention not to be arrested, he may be
said to have been dissuaded, but cannot be said to have been actually
opposed or resisted; and the statute provides only for the latter."
It is only when there are circumstances "affording the officer
reasonable ground to believe that he could not proceed with the
arrest without incurring evident risk of serious injury"' 7 that the
statute is violated.
In Knoff v. State,148 the defendant was convicted under a
statute which punished any person "who willfully delays or ob-
structs any public officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any
duty of his office .... -' 49  The trial evidence was given by an
officer who said he went to defendant's house to "attach" some
cotton. The officer testified: "I walked up to where they were
sitting down, eating dinner, and I asked him to pay it. He said,
'No'; and I said, 'I will have to attach this cotton.' He got up
from where he was eating dinner, and started toward me, and said,
'Get off the place.' He had a knife or something in his hand."'150
The Oklahoma Court reversed the conviction, holding that there
had been no "obstruction" within the meaning of the statute since
the officer had been able to attach the property.
Georgia made it unlawful for any person to "willfully obstruct,
resist, or oppose" an officer.' In Hutchinson v. State, 2 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that this statute was not violated
"" Id. at 65.
... 123 La. 1085, 49 So. 715 (1909).140 Id. at 1085, 49 So. at 716.
" Id. at 1086, 49 So. at 716.t 18 Okl. Cr. 36, 192 Pac. 596 (1920).
Id. at 37, 192 Pac. at 596.
... Id. at 38, 192 Pac. at 597.
1
.Ga. Penal Code 1910, § 311.
1..9 Ga. App. 62, 70 S.E. 352 (1911).
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when the defendant "placed himself in the door of a house and
violently threatened an officer, by declaring that a summons for a
named person could only be served over his dead body." The
Court explained that: "Neither threats alone, unaccompanied by
any effort or apparent intention to execute them, nor even the
doing of an act which impedes, delays, or defeats the executions of
the process with which the officer is armed, but without resisting
him, is sufficient to constitute the offense .... ,,153
Moses v. State' is even closer to point. There, the defendant
was arrested by a deputy sheriff on a warrant charging "wife-
beating." The defendant made no resistance to the arrest, and
drove the deputy sheriff in his buggy to the jail. There, however,
the defendant said
he was not going to jail; that he had done nothing for which to
go to jail. He tried to jerk loose from the officer two or three
times, and the officer called upon a negro bystander to assist him
in putting the defendant in jail.... When the officer first com-
manded him to go into jail, and he refused, the officer left him
and went into the jail, got his pistol, and returned with it; the
defendant remaining quietly outside until the officer returned.155
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and
held: "The words of the statute, 'obstruct, resist, or oppose,' imply
force as a necessary element of the resistance.... The defendant
did not resist his arrest. ... He simply protested against his un-
reasonable imprisonment and emphasized his natural objection to
being incarcerated under the circumstances, by refusing to volun-
tarily go into the jail."' 56
Sloan v. City of Moultrie57 is the third Georgia case on point.
There, a policeman arrested defendant in a barbershop,
caught hold of the defendant's arm and said, "Let's go." The
defendant grabbed hold of the barber chair and would not turn
loose. The policeman hit him over the hand and got him to the
door, where he again braced himself. The policeman knocked
him down with the blackjack, and then picked him up and carried
him to jail. The defendant never at any time made any attempt
to strike the policeman, neither did he curse him. 58
153 Ibid.
"'6 Ga. App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909).166 Ibid.
1:' Id. at -, 64 S.E. at 699-700.
... 61 Ga. App. 885, 7 S.E.2d 760 (1940).168Id. at 887, 7 S.E.2d at 762.
[Vol. 43
SOUTHERN DESEGREGATION
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and said very briefly:
"Under the decision in Moses v. State... the defendant was not
guilty of resisting arrest .... 
159
In Ratcliff v. State'60 the defendant was charged with "ob-
structing" a public officer in the discharge of his duty. The de-
fendant had seen a cow belonging to his wife, and not knowing
that the cow had been seized by a deputy sheriff pursuant to court
order, drove the cow home. The Oklahoma Criminal Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and held: "[T]he word 'obstruct'
must be construed with reference to the other words, 'resist or
oppose,' which imply force. The crime consists in obstructing, re-
sisting or opposing an officer, not merely in impeding or defeating
the execution of the process with which the officer is armed."''
Two recent South Carolina decisions warrant discussion. In
City of Charleston v. Mitchell62 twenty-four Negro high school
students entered a drugstore and sat down at the lunch counter.
The manager twice commanded them to leave, but they refused.
The Chief of Police then ordered them to leave, and they again
refused. They were then placed under arrest, and at this point,
they "all stood up."' 6 " They were then convicted and sentenced to
either a fine of fifty dollars or a sentence of fifteen days under a
city ordinance which makes it unlawful to "assault, resist, hinder,
oppose, molest or interfere with any employee of the.., police
department .... ",163
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed for lack of any
evidence to support the convictions. The Court said that "the
term 'interfere' has been said to import action, not mere inaction,
an active rather than a passive condition, and has been defined as
meaning to interpose.., sometimes in a bad sense.., and specifi-
cally to do something which hinders or prevents.., the performance
of legal duty."' 64  After quoting with approval from the North
Carolina decision in State v. Estes,'65 the court concluded: "It ap-
pears to us that the conduct of the appellants in refusing obedience
to the request of the Chief of Police... was merely inaction on
150 Ibid.
Co 12 OkI. Cr. 448, 158 Pac, 293 (1916).101 Id. at 452, 158 Pac. at 294.
102239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961).
""Id. at 393, 123 S.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 381, 123 S.E.2d at 514.Id. at 394, 123 S.E.2d at 520-21.
id 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581 (1923).
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their part and did not constitute interference with said officer in
the discharge of his official duty."'"6
City of Columbia v. Bouie0 7 is closer to point. There, Bouie
and a companion went into a drugstore and sat down at a booth.
The manager came up with a police officer and twice asked them to
leave. They refused, and the police officer told them that they were
under arrest. Bouie did not get up, and the officer "thereupon
caught him by the arm and lifted him out of the seat.., seized him
by the belt and proceeded to march him out of the store."1 7 a The
officer testified that Bouie "started pushing back and said 'Take
your hands off me' ". Bouie was charged and convicted of resisting
arrest. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed:
It is apparent from the testimony of the arresting officer that
the only "resistance" on Bouie's part was his failure to obey
immediately the officer's order, with the result that the latter
"had to pick him up out of the seat." Resisting arrest is one form
of the common law offense of obstructing justice; and the use of
force is not an essential ingredient of it. But we do not think
that such momentary delay in responding to the officer's com-
mand as is shown by the testimony here amounted to "resistance"
within the intent of the law, City of Charleston v. Mitchell .... 108
There are also two decisions by New York City trial courts
which are relevant, but which arise in a unique statutory context.
New York laws make it unlawful (a) to assault an officer to pre-
vent arrest, (b) to use threats or violence to deter or prevent arrest,
(c) to use force or violence to interfere with an officer in the per-
formance of his duty, and finally (d) "in any case or under any
circumstances not otherwise specially provided for" to "willfully
resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or at-
tempting to discharge, a duty of his office."' 60  The two trial court
decisions arose under this last mentioned statute.
People v. Knight70 arose out of a "peace rally" by two to three
thousand people in Duffy Square. When the rally ended, some of
the participants refused to leave, but instead sat down on the street
"°239 S.C. at 395, 123 S.E.2d at 521.167239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962).
114 Id. at 573, 124 S.E.2d at 333.
118 Id. at 574, 124 S.E.2d at 333.
..' N.Y. CITY PENAL CODE § 1851, quoted in People v. Knight, 228
N.Y.S.2d 981, 984 n.2 (Magis. Ct. 1962).170 228 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Magis. Ct. 1962).
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blocking traffic. A policeman told defendant Knight to move to
the sidewalk, and Knight did not move. The policeman then said,
"You are under arrest. I am taking you in." 1" The officer put
his hand on defendant's shoulder, defendant pulled it off and ran
into a group upon the sidewalk. The officer was knocked down by
others, lost a glove, was hit on the shoulder, but nevertheless went
into the crowd to apprehend the defendant. Thereupon, the de-
fendant lay down on the sidewalk and would not move. It was
necessary to carry him into the police wagon.
Defendants Itkin and Supernaw were also directed twice by the
arresting officers to get up and move on. They continued sitting
mute in the street. The officer then placed them under arrest. As
he proceeded to take a hold of Supernaw, Itkin locked arms with
Supernaw. It was necessary for the arresting officer, together
with fellow officers to pry them apart and to carry them to the
police wagon.
The Committing Magistrate held that "to interfere and obstruct
and delay within Penal Law, Section 1851 does not and need not
require active resistance and force by the defendants," and that "the
People have adduced sufficient evidence as warrants that these de-
fendants be held for trial by the Court .... 171
People v. Martinez 72 arose under a somewhat similar situation.
Four defendants (and three others who failed to appear and whose
bonds were therefore forfeited) went to complain to the Police
Commissioner about alleged police brutality. They were told that
the Commissioner would not or could not see them, and they seated
themselves on the floor of the public corridor about 100 feet from
the Police Commissioner's office. They were told to leave, and
when they refused, they were charged with "unlawful intrusion. ' '172a
As they continued to sit, they were further told that if they did not
move voluntarily, they would be charged with obstructing and
resisting a public officer in the discharge of his duty. Defendants
Martinez and Sanchez refused to do so, and had to be carried out
bodily to the public elevator. The City Criminal Court, with
absolutely no discussion, concluded that "The defendants Raphael
110
* Id. at 983.
171 Id. at 987.
2 43 Misc. 2d 94, 250 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. County Crim. Ct. 1964).
172, Id. at -, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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Martinez and Jose Sanchez are also found guilty of resisting a
public officer in the discharge of his duty .... ,)172b
The two above New York decisions (apart from the scuffling
and arms-locking in Knight) are perhaps the closest factual cases,
and they would be highly persuasive on the Chapel Hill situation
were it not for the unique statutory context and the almost pre-
liminary nature of the decisions. The South Carolina decisions
reversing the "resisting" convictions of the demonstrators,173 and
the Georgia decisions reversing the "resisting" convictions of
Moses' 74 and Sloan,'75 suggest that the Chapel Hill demonstrators
did not "resist" arrest under the North Carolina statute. The
federal cases, and the decisions by the Supreme Courts of other
states, suggest that the "resisting" arrest statutes are intended to
apply only when there is active resistance, or when officers in fact
are deterred from the performance of their duty. This is certainly
the implication of the North Carolina decision in State v. Estes.170
Such an interpretation of the statute would be in harmony with the
North Carolina cases which construe the "resisting arrest" statute
narrowly, and in favor of the defendants.
In any event, a citizen is entitled to resist an arrest if the arrest
is illegal, 17s which raises the issue of whether the Constitution pre-
cludes the arrests in the restaurant sit-ins.
172b Id. at -, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
. City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962);
City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512 (1961).
' Moses v. State, 6 Ga. App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909).
..5 Sloan v. City of Moultrie, 61 Ga. App. 885, 7 S.E.2d 760 (1940).
17- 185 N.C. 752, 117 S.E. 581 (1923). Most of the North Carolina
cases involve situations of this sort. See, e.g., State v. Wray, 217 N.C. 167,
7 S.E.2d 468 (1940). There, when defendant Wray was placed under arrest,
two other defendants "caught hold of the officers and of Wray and stated
that the officers should not take Wray to jail.... [A] struggle with the
officers ensued wherein all three defendants were engaged...." Id. at 168,
7 S.E.2d at 468. The court held that the demurrers to this evidence were
properly overruled, "since the State's evidence, if believed, was amply
sufficient to sustain the convictions." Id. at 169, 7 S.E.2d at 469.
... See cases cited note 121 supra.
... Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). There, the
petitioner was arrested in a cafe for "loitering" and when he was taken out-
side, according to the police testimony, he "was very argumentative-lie
argued with us back and forth and so then we placed a disorderly conduct
charge on him." Id. at 200. The Supreme Court held that the disorderly
conduct charge could not stand because the "law itself seems to provide that
if a man wrongfully arrested fails to object to the arresting officer, he waives
any right to complain later that the arrest was unlawful." Id. at 206. See
also State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954); State v. Belk,
76 N.C. 10 (1877); State v. Curtis, 2 N.C. 471 (1797).
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B. Sit-Ins and the Fourteenth Amendment
In Chapel Hill, the demonstrators went to the segregated
restaurants, were denied service, and sat quietly until the police
arrived. They were then arrested, charged and convicted of tres-
pass. This, by now, is a familiar pattern throughout the South."'
Over 3,000 demonstrators have been arrested and convicted in
state courts for this type of activity. But, despite a dozen Supreme
Court decisions (each one reversing a sit-in conviction by the
state courts), it is still not clear whether the owner of a restaurant
can call upon the state police and judicial machinery to enforce his
desire to exclude patrons on the basis of race.
Several things, however, are clear. Generally speaking, the
owner of property does not have an absolute right to do with it as
he will. Our society does not tolerate what Walter Lippman calls
the "despotic theory of private property."' 80  "The twelfth century
assize of nuisance began the body of law which cuts down what
the owner of Blackacre can do in view of his duty of neighborli-
ness."""1 More specifically, a restaurant owner is not deprived of
property or liberty when a state or the federal government com-
mands that he terminate discrimination among his patrons on the
basis of race.'8 2 Equally clear, however, is the fact that not every
individual act of racial discrimination runs afoul of the fourteenth
amendment, for that amendment prohibits "only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States.... [It] erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong-
ful."18
3
1. The Contentions of the Demonstrators.-The demonstrators
relied upon a series of arguments to prove that the restaurant dis-
crimination resulted from "state action."'8 4  First, it was con-
... Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315.
... Newsweek, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 21.
"" Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights,
15 HASTINGs L.J. 135, 142-43 (1963).
188 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 241, 258
(1964). Mr. Justice Black, concurring, added that "The motel's argument
that Title 11 violates the Thirteenth Amendment is so insubstantial that it
requires no further discussion." Id. at 278 n.12.
1'Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1947), citing the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
18, The "demonstrations" were clearly designed to publicize the fact and
implication of segregation, and additionally it was contended that the sit-ins
were protected as "free speech" within the first and fourteenth amendments.
See note 201 infra.
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tended that the restaurants were public in nature, although private
in ownership,'85 and the state involvement (through licensing, in-
spection and regulation) made the fourteenth amendment applica-
ble. In short, the state could not (within the constitutional pro-
hibitions) license a public restaurant to practice discrimination
based on race.186
Second, it was contended that there was "state action" when
the state aided private discrimination through its police powers of
arrest and accusation, and through its judicial powers of trial and
conviction. Reliance was placed upon the "restrictive covenant
case," Shelley v. Kraemer 7 There, the Supreme Court held that
it was unconstitutional "state action" when a state court in a
private action at law enforced a real estate covenant which forbade
any neighbors to sell to Negroes. The demonstrators argued from
this decision that "if the Constitution precludes judicial vindication
through civil remedies for a right of private discrimination in the
selection of neighbors, then it must at least equally preclude judicial
enforcement by criminal law of a restriction of premises catering to
the public."""8 The Supreme Court of Delaware, at least, was in
...In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Supreme Court
reversed a trespass conviction when the petitioner disobeyed the order to
cease distributing leaflets on the streets of a "private" town and said:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitu-
tional rights of those who use it." Id. at 506.
.. Reliance was placed on Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the
1883 Civil Rights Cases: "In every material sense applicable to the practical
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment... keepers of inns and managers
of places of public amusements are agents or instrumentalities of the State,
because they are charged with duties to the public, and are amenable, in
respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation." 109 U.S.
at 58-59. If Mr. Justice Harlan was wrong in 1883, the increasing public
importance of restaurants, and the corresponding increase in state regulation
and control, make him right today.
" 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Long before Shelley, the Court emphasized that
the fourteenth amendment's requirement of equal treatment by the state
reaches "state action of every kind," legislative, executive, and judicial.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
... Brief of Petitioners, p. 17, Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
Attorney Joseph Rauh there argued that
Indeed, the instant case is far stronger than Shelley. Here the State
process which enforces racial discrimination is not merely civil
process as in Shelley, but the substantive criminal law of the State...
Even more so than in Shelley, where the State merely opened its courts
for private redress, here, in the application of a criminal prohibition, the
State is expressing and applying a public policy favoring discrimination.
Moreover,... the asserted private and property interest in Shelley was
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agreement with this argument.8 9
The third major contention was that there is no "right" in the
restaurant owners to refuse service on the basis of race. "Rights"
are created by law, and it was argued that the states can neither
recognize, countenance, or protect a "right" of discrimination
against Negroes at places of public accommodation. 9 ' The con-
verse was also argued, that the constitutional guarantee of "equal
protection" imports an affirmative obligation on the state to assure
non-discriminatory treatment in the areas of public life where the
state is otherwise intimately concerned and involved.""'
The Supreme Court reversed all the sit-in convictions without
squarely reaching any of the above contentions.
that in the home-owner's choice of his neighbors-an interest which
certainly stands high in the traditional respect and protection of the law.
By contrast, here the State's process has been made available to enforce
discrimination.., on a merry-go-round at an amusement park catering
to the general public.
Id. at 16.
... State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963). The Delaware court
concluded that
the private actions of the owners ... of a place of public accommodation
in refusing service to a patron which are predicated upon racially dis-
criminatory grounds do not contravene the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment....
Secondly, we hold that such owner may not call upon the State to
assist him in enforcing his private policy of racial discrimination. If the
State acts in such a manner, the judicial power would be placed behind
and in favor of racial discrimination, and such action is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 387. The Delaware Court acknowledged that this might result in
"self help" by the proprietor but said that "the State may not act un-
constitutionally merely to avoid a threat of violence." Id. at 386.
..0 In brief, there can be no "sit-in" unless there is a "throw-out," and the
contention is that the State cannot create or recognize the right to throw-
out customers on the basis of race. Subsequent to this argument, the Su-
preme Court recognized that there was "state action" within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment when Alabama recognized and enforced a
common-law right to recover in a private law suit for libel. "The test is
not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised." New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
10' Brief of Petitioner, pp. 28-29, Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
An allied contention was that the refusal to serve Negroes was based on a
"widespread custom," which in turn had received massive and long-continued
support from state law and policy. It was suggested that "where Arkansas
and South Carolina themselves move to send petitioners to jail for disobeying
orders given in conformance with the segregation custom which has for
many decades been the keystone of the public policy of each state, the state
will not be allowed to visit this penalty on these petitioners on the utterly un-
realistic theory that state power is to no extent involved." Brief of
Petitioners, pp. 48-49, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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2. The Initial 1961 Decisions.-The first case arose, of all
places, in Delaware. The Wilmington Parking Authority built
a public parking facility in downtown Wilmington, and leased space
on the street level to the Eagle Coffee Shoppe. The Coffee Shoppe
refused to serve a Negro patron because of his color, and the patron
brought action for an injunction and declaratory relief. The
Delaware Supreme Court held that under Delaware statutory law
(which incorporated common law), a restaurant owner had a right
to refuse service on the basis of race. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and held that the exclusion of the Negro
was discriminatory state action in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority.'92 Mr. Justice Clark, for the Court, held that private
conduct violates the fourteenth amendment when "to some signifi-
cant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to
have become involved in it."' 93  There was "significant involve-
ment" in this landlord-tenant relationship because
the Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to dis-
charge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment
imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state
participation. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsi-
bilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
them.... By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the
State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service,
but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind
the admitted discrimination .... when a State leases public prop-
erty in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the
case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must
be complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were
binding covenants written into the agreement itself.'9 4
The holding certainly approaches the contention generally made
by the sit-in defendants, i.e., that the equal protection clause re-
quires affirmative protective action by the State within the area of
its public concerns.'95
192 365 U.S. 715 (1961).193 Id. at 722.
19, Id. at 725, 726.
.95 Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result on the theory that the
Delaware courts had given effect to the state law permitting restaurant
discrimination, and that "Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 727. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and
Whittaker agreed with Justice Stewart that a state statute "'authorizing
discriminatory classification'... is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment,"
[Vol. 43
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Garner v. Louisiana96 was the first typical sit-in case to reach
the Court. There, a group of Negro students entered dime stores
in Baton Rouge, sat at the lunch counter where they were denied
service, were arrested, and then convicted for the crime of disturb-
ing the peace. In Louisiana, the crime of disturbing the peace is
not complete without "boisterous or unruly conduct" by the de-
fendants, or peaceful conduct which incites "an imminent public
commotion."19  The Court (per Mr. Chief Justice Warren) re-
versed the convictions without deciding the major contentions on
the theory that there was a complete absence of evidence -to support
the elements of the crime, and that conviction without evidence is a
denial of due process.
19 8
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the reversal of the convictions,
but on different theories. He reasoned, first, that the petitioners
were denied service because of a state fostered "custom," that the
custom of segregation in Louisiana "is at least as powerful as any
law," and that "where the segregation policy is the policy of a
State, it matters not that the agency to enforce it is a private
enterprise."' 99  Additionally, Mr. Justice Douglas ruled that these
restaurants were licensed by the state to serve the public and that
"those who license enterprises for public use should not have under
our Constitution the power to license it for the use of only one race.
For there is the overriding constitutional requirement that all state
power be exercised so as not to deny equal protection to any
group. 2
00
Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in reversing the convictions but
for other reasons. First, in two of the situations the demonstrators
sat with the apparent consent of the proprietor until the police ar-
rived, and that this sitting "was a form of expression within the
but these Justices were not sure that the Delaware courts had so held and
would remand for further clarification. Id. at 729 (Harlan, J., dissenting).106368 U.S. 157 (1961).
107 Id. at 169.
'o8 368 U.S. at 164.100 Id. at 181.
'"
0 Id. at 185. Mr. Justice Douglas elaborated:
The authority to license a business for public use is derived from the
public. Negroes are as much a part of that public as are whites. A
municipality granting a license to operate a business for the public
represents Negroes as well as all other races who live there. A license
to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a public facility and
necessarily imports, in law, equality of use for all members of the public.
Id. at 184.
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range of protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' '201
Secondly, Mr. Justice Harlan believed that the Louisiana penal
statute was "unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertainty as
applied."2 '
3. The 1963 Decisions.-In 1963, there were four more sit-in
cases, out of Greenville, South Carolina, °3  Birmingham, Ala-
bama," 4 Durham, North Carolina,0 5 and New Orleans, Louisi-
ana. 06 In the Greenville, Birmingham, and Durham cases, segre-
gation in restaurants was required by city ordinance, and for this
reason the Court reversed the convictions for "trespass." It said
in Peterson v. City of Greenville :207
[T]hese convictions cannot stand, even assuming... that the
manager would have acted as he did independently of the exis-
tence of the ordinance.... When a state agency passes a law
compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because
of race, and the State's criminal processes are employed in a way
which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a
palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved
by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discrimina-
tors.20 8
In the New Orleans case of Lombard v. Louisiana20 0 there was
no state law or city ordinance requiring restaurant segregation, but
there was the typical breach-of-the-peace law. When the demon-
strations started in that city, both the Chief of Police and the Mayor
201Id. at 199.
We would surely have to be blind not to recognize that petitioners were
sitting at these counters, where they knew they would not be served,
in order to demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining
facilities in this part of the country.
Such a demonstration... is as much a part of the "free trade of ideas"
as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as "speech." It,
like speech, appeals to good sense.., just as much as, if not more than,
a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This
Court has never limited the right to speak... to a mere verbal expression.
If the act of displaying a red flag... is a liberty encompassed within
free speech ... the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter
with the consent of the owner as a demonstration of opposition to en-
forced segregation, is surely within the same range of protection.
Id. at 201-02.
202 Id. at 205.
20' Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
2o Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
... Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
20 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
2 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
208 Id. at 248.
2. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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issued well-publicized statements that they would enforce the
breach-of-peace law and would not permit Negroes to seek de-
segregated service in restaurants. When the Negroes sought
service, the restaurant manager denied it "in obedience to the direc-
tive of the city officials." The Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions and said: "A State, or a city, may act as authoritatively
through its executive as through its legislative body.... Conse-
quently, the city must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance
prohibiting such conduct." After then referring to the Peterson
decision, the Court continued: "[T]he State cannot achieve the
same result by an official command which has at least as much
coercive effect as an ordinance.
2 1 0
A final case in 1963 was Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham.
211
There, two ministers had been convicted of "inciting, aiding, and
abetting" students to violate the criminal trespass laws by seeking
service at a segregated restaurant. The evidence was that the
students had met at the home of the ministers, where persons
volunteered to "try" certain restaurants, and the ministers arranged
for their transportation and bail. As the trespass conviction of
the students had been reversed,2 12 the "aiding and abetting" con-
viction of the ministers was likewise reversed, because "It is
generally recognized that there can be no conviction for aiding and
21 Id. at 273. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, had two additional
reasons for finding that Louisiana had become involved to a "significant ex-
tent" within the concept of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961). First, he repeated his concept in Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961) that "There is no constitutional way, as I see it, in
which a State can license and supervise a business serving the public and
endow it with the authority to manage that business on the basis of apartheid,
which is foreign to our Constitution." 373 U.S. at 283. Second, Mr. Justice
Douglas advanced the concept of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
that judicial action is state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. He said:
We live under a constitution that proclaims equal protection of the laws.
That standard is our guide. And under that standard business serving
the public cannot seek the aid of the state police or the state courts or
the state legislatures to foist racial segregation in public places under its
ownership and control.., we have 'state' action here, wholly apart from
the activity of the Mayor and police, for Louisiana has interceded with
its judiciary to put criminal sanctions behind racial discrimination in
public places. She may not do so consistently with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
373 U.S. at 277-78. (Citation omitted.)
- 373 U.S. 262 (1963).
212 Gober v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
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abetting someone to do an innocent act."213  Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred for reasons of freedom of speech:
[D]ealing as we are in the realm of expression, I do not think
a State may punish incitement of activity in circumstances where
there is a substantial likelihood that such activity may be con-
stitutionally protected.... To ignore that factor would unduly
inhibit freedom of expression, even though criminal liability for
incitement does not ordinarily depend upon the event of the
conduct incited.21 4
4. The 1964 Decisions.-In 1964, there were five more sit-in
cases, but again there was no majority opinion which decided any
of the crucial issues.
One of the five cases, Robinson v. Florida, 5 was an extension,
and decided on the basis, of the Peterson210 decision of the previous
year. Eighteen demonstrators went into Shell's City Restaurant
in a department store in Miami and refused to leave when so
directed by the manager. They were tried and convicted under a
statute which penalized such refusal.2"' At the time, however, the
Florida Board of Health had in effect a regulation which required
that "where colored persons are employed or accommodated" sepa-
rate toilet and lavatory rooms must be provided.218 The Court
(per Mr. Justice Black) reversed the convictions because of this
health department regulation.
While these Florida regulations do not directly and expressly
forbid restaurants to serve both white and colored people together,
they certainly embody a state policy putting burdens upon any
restaurant which serves both races, burdens bound to discourage
the serving of the two races together. Of course, state action,
of the kind that falls within the proscription of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, may be brought
about through the State's administrative and regulatory agencies
just as through its legislature.... Here as in Peterson v. City
of Greenville, supra, we conclude that the State through its
regulations has become involved to such a significant extent in
bringing about restaurant segregation that appellants' trespass
convictions must be held to reflect that state policy and therefore
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.210
"'1 373 U.S. at 265.
211 Id. at 260. (Citation omitted.)
215378 U.S. 153 (1964).
... Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
2
.FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.141 (Supp. 1964).
21 FLA. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 170C, § 8.06 (1962).
219 378 U.S. at 156-57. (Citation omitted.)
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One of the other 1964 decisions also involved an extension of
the "state action" concept, this time to private policemen given
"special deputy" status by the state. In Griffin v. Maryland,220
a group of demonstrators went to the Glen Echo Amusement Park
in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C., purchased tickets,
and got on the merry-go-round. One Collins, who headed the
amusement park guard force, came up and told them to get off, that
it was the park's policy "not to have colored people on the rides."
The demonstrators refused to leave, and Collins put them under
arrest. Collins was paid by the park, but had been deputized as a
"special" deputy sheriff by the county and wore a deputy sheriff's
badge.
The Court held that "to the extent that the State undertakes
an obligation to enforce a private policy of racial segregation, the
State is charged with racial discrimination and violates the Four-
teenth Amendment."22' The Court found such an unlawful State
obligation in the fact that Collins "wore a sheriff's badge and
consistently identified himself as a deputy sheriff rather than as an
employee of the park.... If an individual is possessed of state
authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is
state action. 22 1
Barr v. City of Columbia0 3 is similar to Garner v. Louisiana.224
Five Negro college students entered a South Carolina drugstore
and were promptly arrested by waiting policemen and convicted
of "breach of the peace." It was admitted that the demonstrators
were "polite, quiet and peaceful from the time they entered the
store to the time they left." Under these circumstances, ruled the
Court, the breach of peace conviction cannot stand, "because of the
frequent occasions on which we have reversed under the Fourteenth
Amendment convictions of peaceful individuals who were convicted
of breach of the peace because of the acts of hostile on-
2'378 U.S. 130 (1964).
221 Id. at 136.
222 Id. at 135. Mr. Justice Clark concurred because "under the pe-
culiar facts here ... the State 'must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity.' See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."
Id. at 137. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented because "the involvement of the
State is no different from what it would have been had the arrests been
made by a regular policeman dispatched from police headquarters." Id. at
138. Justices Black and White joined in this dissent.22378 U.S. 146 (1964).
224368 U.S. 157 (1961).
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lookers ... ,2241a Additionally, ruled the Court, "Since there was no
evidence to support the breach-of-peace convictions, they should not
stand. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199.' 225
Bouie v. City of Columbia226 was decided under the due process
proscription of vagueness in criminal statutes. Two Negro students
entered the Eckerd Drug Store in Columbia, South Carolina, and
sat down at a booth. They were not served, but asked to leave.
When they refused, they were arrested, charged, and convicted of
criminal trespass. The trespass law then on the books penalized
"every entry upon the lands of another where any horse, mule, cow,
hog or any other livestock is pastured, or any other land of another,
after notice from the owner... prohibiting said entry."2 "
It was not until after their trial conviction that the South
Carolina Supreme Court initially construed the trespass statute to
penalize, not only entry but also the act of "remaining on" the
premises of another after receiving notice to leave.228 Therefore,
argued the demonstrators, they were punished "for conduct that
was not criminal at the time they committed it." The Supreme
Court agreed with this contention and reversed the conviction be-
cause it rested on a statute which "violated the requirement of the
Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warning of
the conduct which it prohibits." 29
Bell v. Maryland3 was the longest (100 pages in the United
States Reports) and the most important of the 1964 decisions, as
six justices therein discussed the merits of the basic contentions.
The Court opinion, however, reversed the convictions for non-
constitutional reasons.
Twelve Negro students entered the Hooper's Restaurant in
Baltimore, Maryland, and were arrested for violation of the criminal
trespass law. After their convictions had been affirmed by the state
"" 378 U.S. at 150.
225 Id. at 151.
228378 U.S. 347 (1964).
"2 S.C. CODE § 16-386 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
28 378 U.S. at 350, referring to City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570,
124 S.E.2d 332 (1962).
21 378 U.S. at 350. Mr. Justice Black dissented on the theory that the
common law punished as trespass both entering and remaining upon property
without permission, and that the South Carolina courts were justified in
giving the criminal trespass statute this interpretation. Mr. Justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice White joined in this dissent. Id. at 363.
2"0 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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supreme court, both the Baltimore City Council, and the Maryland
legislature enacted public accommodations laws which "accord pe-
titioners a right to be served in Hooper's restaurant, and make
unlawful conduct like that of Hooper... in refusing them service
because of their race."' ' -
Mr. Justice Brennan (joined by Clark and Stewart) announced
the opinion of the Court, which was to remand the case to the
Maryland courts for further proceedings. This course was taken
because "Maryland follows the universal common-law rule that
when the legislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise re-
moves the State's condemnation from conduct that was formerly
deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending
criminal proceeding charging such conduct. 2 32
In elaboration, the Court opinion noted: "A legislature that
passed a public accommodations law making it unlawful to deny
service on account of race probably did not desire that persons
should still be prosecuted and punished for the 'crime' of seeking
service from a place of public accommodations which denies it on
account of race."2 33
"Because of the possibility that the state court would now re-
verse the convictions" it is inappropriate, reasoned Mr. Justice
Brennan, for the Supreme Court to render an "advisory opinion"
on the grave constitutional issues otherwise before it.
Mr. Justice Douglas reached the merits of the controversy, and
ruled for the demonstrators for three separate reasons. First, the
fourteenth amendment made all persons born in the United States
"citizens" and provided that no State shall enforce any law which
shall abridge the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States." "[T]he right to be served in places of public
accommodations," he said, "is an incident of national citizen-
ship, ...,,34 and therefore: "When one citizen because of his race,
creed, or color is denied the privilege of being treated as any other
citizen in places of public accommodations, we have classes of citi-
zenship, one being more degrading than the other. This is at war
with the one class of citizenship created by the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments." 3"
231 Id. at 228.
2" Id. at 230.
233 Id. at 235.
23
1 Id. at 250.
231 Id. at 252.
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Second, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that the modern restaurant
is "affected with a public interest," and that "state action" was
therefore involved:
Private property is involved, but it is property that is serving
the public.... Here it is a restaurant refusing service to a
Negro. But so far as principle and law are concerned it might
just as well be a hospital refusing admission to a sick or injured
Negro .... or a drugstore refusing antibiotics to a Negro, or a
bus denying transportation to a Negro, or a telephone company
refusing to install a telephone in a Negro's home.23 6
Third, Mr. Justice Douglas saw a denial of equal protection
when Maryland enforced a policy of segregation "with her police,
her prosecutors, and her courts" :237
The preferences involved in Shelley v. Kraemer and its com-
panion cases were far more personal than the motivations of the
corporate managers in the present case when they declined service
to Negroes. Why should we refuse to let state courts enforce
apartheid in residential areas of our cities but let state courts
enforce apartheid in restaurants? If a court decree is state action
in one case, it is in the other.23 8
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred with Mr. Justice Douglas, and
also wrote an opinion of his own (in which the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred).
In the following passages, which in no way give credit to his
full thirty-two-page opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg expounded the
view that the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause creates
a positive obligation on the state to remove the disabilities barring
Negroes from the public conveyances and places of public accom-
modation. Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed out that:
Underlying the Congressional discussions, and at the heart
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection,
was the assumption that the State... was obligated to guarantee
all citizens access to places of public accommodation. This ob-
ligation was firmly rooted in ancient Anglo-American tradition.280
The history of the affirmative obligations existing at common law
serves partly to explain the negative-'deny to any person'-
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. For it was assumed
"'Id. at 252-53. (Citation omitted.)
17 Id. at 257.288 Id. at 259.
230 Id. at 296-97.
[Vol. 43
SOUTHERN DESEGREGATION
that under state law, when the Negro's disability as a citizen was
removed, he would be assured the same public civil rights that the
law had guaranteed white persons.
240
Mr. justice Goldberg also quoted from Mr. Justice Bradley,
who had authored the majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 41
that: "Denying includes inaction as well as action. And denying
the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as
well as the omission to pass laws for protection." 2  This view of
Mr. Justice Bradley, said Mr. Justice Goldberg, is "fully consonant
with this Court's recognition that state conduct which might be
described as 'inaction' can nevertheless constitute responsible 'state
action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 43 Mr.
Justice Goldberg concluded that:
The decision of Maryland's highest court in sustaining these
trespass convictions cannot be described as 'neutral,' for the
decision is as affirmative in effect as if the State had enacted an
unconstitutional law explicitly authorizing racial discrimination
in places of public accommodation. A State, obligated under
the Fourteenth Amendment to maintain a system of law in which
Negroes are not denied protection in their claim to be treated as
equal members of the community, may not use its criminal
trespass laws to frustrate the constitutionally granted right. Nor,
it should be added, may a State frustrate this right by legitimat-
ing a proprietor's attempt at self-help 2 44
Mr. Justice Black also reached the merits, and wrote a dissenting
opinion in which he voted to affirm the trespass convictions. Mr.
Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White joined in this dissent. This
twenty-page dissent was summarized later by its author as follows:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not of its own force compel a
restaurant owner to accept customers he does not want to serve,
even though his reason for refusing to serve them may be his
racial prejudice, adherence to local custom, or what he conceives
to be his economic self-interest, and ... the arrest and conviction
of a person for trespassing in a restaurant under such circum-
stances is not the kind of "state action" forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment.24
5
2,0 Id. at 301.
... 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
242 378 U.S. 226, 309 nn.29-30, quoting the Bradley-Woods correspon-
dence.
"'Id. at 310-11.
'"Id. at 311.
" Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 365 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
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5. The 1965 Decisions.-In the October Term, 1964, the
Supreme Court wrote the temporary finish to the sit-in controversy.
On analogy to the situation in Bell v. Maryland,240 the Court held
that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "abated" all such
pending cases.
In the consolidated cases of Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and
Lupper v. Arkansas,2 47 the highest courts of South Carolina and
Arkansas had affirmed convictions based upon state trespass statutes
against Negroes for participating in sit-in demonstrations in the
luncheon facilities of retail stores. The Court (per Mr. Justice
Clark) held that:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places of
public accommodations and removes peaceful attempts to be
served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities.
Although the conduct in the present cases occurred prior to enact-
ment of the Act, the still pending convictions are abated by its
passage.248
The Court reasoned that if these had been federal prosecutions,
the actions clearly would have abated ("inflicting punishment at a
time when it can no longer further any legislative purpose... would
be unnecessarily vindictive" )249 and that here, "it follows that the
same rule must prevail under the Supremacy Clause which requires
that a contrary state practice or state statute must give way. "250
A Federal Savings Statute provides that "the repeal of any
statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty
... unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide."'251  The
Court held that the statute was concerned with "technical abate-
ment" when a statute was amended or repealed. Here, in contrast,
"the Civil Rights Act works no such technical abatement. It sub-
stitutes a right for a crime. So drastic a change is well beyond
the narrow language of amendment and repeal. 25 2
26 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
" 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
2
'
8 Id. at 308.
2 9 Id. at 313.250 Id. at 315.2511 U.S.C. § 109 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
2 2 379 U.S. at 314. There were four dissents from this holding. Mr.
justice Black thought that the "savings clause" was applicable here and
that nowhere in the Civil Rights Act, or in the volume of legislative history,
was there any proposal to abate the pending criminal convictions. Id. at318. Mr. Justice Harlan knew of no case which suggests that the doctrine
of abatement can be applied to another jurisdiction, and he doubted the
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The Hamm decision was applied in Blow v. North Carolina.253
There, a group of Negroes in the town of Enfield went to the
Plantation Restaurant. The restaurant served whites only and
carried a sign to that effect on its front door. When the Negroes
arrived, the owner locked the door, opening it for white customers.
The Negroes remained outside until arrested, and were convicted
under the state trespass law. The Supreme Court reversed per
curiam, quoting Hamm:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places
of public accommodation and removes peaceful attempts to be
served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities.
Although the conduct in the present cases occurred prior to the
enactment of the Act, the still pending convictions are abated by
its passage.254
Finally, also on the basis of Harem, the Supreme Court without
opinion reversed a Tennessee sit-in conviction for conspiracy to
injure business of a "white" Tennessee cafeteria. McKinnie v.
Tennessee.255
6. Recapitulation.-In these sit-in cases, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that a state cannot convict unless the statute used to
punish the demonstrators gives "fair warning of the conduct which
it prohibits."25 6 The demonstrators may not be punished "because
of the acts of hostile onlookers" ;257 or without competent evidence
to support the charge as made. 5 s
The Supreme Court continues to hold that private conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the equal protection
clause "unless to some significant extent the State in any of its
Constitutional power to so apply it here: "for the legislative record is barren
of any evidence showing that giving effect to past state trespass convictions
would result in placing any burden on present interstate commerce." Id. at
325. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote that "In Bell v. Maryland, we said that a
State's abatement policy was for the State to determine.... I would vacate
the judgments and remand the cases to the state courts for reconsideration
in the light of the supervening federal legislation." Id. at 326-27. Mr.
Justice White opined that "the common law presumption of abatement was
reversed by" the Federal Savings Statute, and that "had Congress intended
to ratify massive disobedience to the law, so often attended by violence, I
feel sure it would have said so in unmistakable language." Id. at 328.
-' 379 U.S. 684 (1965).
21 Id. at 685.
235 33 U.S. LAW WEEK 4319 (April 6, 1965) (per curiam).
... Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
... Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
2"8 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
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manifestations has been found to have become involved in it."'259
The Court has found significant state involvement when a municipal
agency rents cafeteria space in a public parking building;260 when
a county "deputizes" the private guard who first orders the demon-
strators away and then arrests for trespass ;261 when the state health
officials require separate toilet facilities if the restaurants choose to
serve Negroes and whites ;262 when a city by ordinance requires
segregated restaurants ;263 or when high city officials threaten to
apply "breach of the peace" laws against sit-in demonstrators.2 0 4
Individual justices go much further. Mr. Justice Douglas
would find "significant state involvement" and a violation of the
equal protection clause when the state licenses a restaurant to serve
the general public and permits segregation within the licensed
premises, 26 5 or when a state enforces a policy of private segrega-
tion "with her police, her prosecutors, and her courts."' ' 0  Mr.
Justice Goldberg (the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas agree)
believes that a state is "obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment
to maintain a system of law in which Negroes are not denied
protection in their claim to be treated as equal members of the
community. ' 26 7 Mr. Justice Harlan believes that until the moment
the proprietor tells the sit-in demonstrator to leave, the "free speech"
provisions of the Constitution give the demonstrator immunity
from state arrest.268
Other individual justices disagree. Justices Black, Harlan, and
White have written that the fourteenth amendment "of its own
force" does not compel a restaurant owner to serve anyone, and
that the state is "neutral" when it enforces private segregation
through the application of its criminal trespass laws.269
The Supreme Court has cleared its dockets by "abating" all
sit-in cases in restaurants, cafes, motels, hotels, and other estab-
2 ' Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 368 U.S. 715 (1961).
260 Ibid.
... Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 180 (1964).
2.2 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
"' Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
... Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
... Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 347, 252-53 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
20 Id. at 259.
217 Id. at 296-97.
... Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201-02 (1961). See note 201
supra.200 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318-46 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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lishments covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.270 But not all
establishments-the ordinary barber shop, for example-are so
covered. Thus, the issues and contentions of the parties"7' are not
yet moot. However, unless and until the Supreme Court rules in
a sit-in conviction in an establishment not covered by the Civil
Rights Act, the law in this area must remain in doubt.
C. Street-Blocking and Freedom of Speech
The Chapel Hill demonstrators not only sat in the segregated
restaurants, they also sat down on the street at the main intersec-
tions to confront the community with a problem long pushed into
the background. It was now in the open.
Novelist John Ehle tells of the events and his emotional re-
sponse:
On the Durham highway three Negroes and two whites sat
down several hundred feet from the Eastgate Shopping Center.
Astonished drivers pulled to a stop and stared in bewilderment.
One driver inched forward until his bumper touched two of the
prone young men. They didn't move. The driver turned off the
car motor and sat there, exasperated. Soon cars were backed up
for half a mile, two abreast. Even the police cars couldn't get
through....
At the main intersection of town, the chief of police asked the
demonstrators to leave. They did so. But soon five Negro and
three white demonstrators returned and lay down. Several cars
wove their way between them at high speeds. They continued to
lie there in the road even so.
The paddy wagon, which was being driven by the fire chief,
kept hauling people away, until at last, some say, it broke down,
blocking a road itself....
In all, that day ninety-eight people were arrested.
Whatever complacency might have existed in the town that
morning was gone by now. Never before had the town arrested so
many people; not in many decades had it been so mightily inter-
fered with. Many citizens were enraged. The homes of the
aldermen and policemen were busy with telephone calls....
Negro parents knelt in prayer in the churches and in their
homes. Whatever belief had been promoted by segregationists
that the Negro community was itself disinterested was dispelled
now. The Negroes had offered up in one day scores of their
young people. In spite of their fears of jails and policemen and
270 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
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authority, they had sent the best young people they had into the
very jaws of civil authority, and their only appeal, the one many
of them made all that night through, was in the form of prayer to
the only Higher Authority they knew.2
72
John Ehle concluded that the sight of so many young persons
being arrested for an ideal "was deeply moving, as perhaps the
arrest of young people who are representing a cause they feel is
right and good must always be moving, and that was the point of
it all."27 3
The street blocking was a drastic appeal to the community
conscience which the community could not ignore, but it was not,
under existing decisions, a form of communication protected by
the "free speech" provisions of the Constitution. A state or a
city, under a well defined and evenly applied law, may regulate the
time, place, manner, and circumstances of street parades and street
gatherings. A brief review of the major cases makes this clear.
In Hague v. CIO,274 Jersey City had denied union organizers
the right to parade, to hold rallies, to distribute literature on the
street corners, and defended this denial on the theory that "the
city's ownership of streets and parks is as absolute as one's owner-
ship of his home, with consequent power altogether to exclude
citizens from the use thereof. .. Mr. Justice Roberts rejected
this view: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. 217 6 Mr. Justice Roberts added by way of dictum that this
protected use of the streets for public discussion "is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order.... 2 7
72 EHLE 192-94.
"'8Id. at 190.
"' 307 U.S. 496 (1939).275 Id. at 514.
', Id. at 515. There was no opinion by the Court in this case. Mr.
Justice Black joined the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts. Mr. Justice Stone
wrote a concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice Reed. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote an individual concurring opinion. Mr. Justice McReynolds
and Mr. Justice Butler each wrote dissenting opinions. Justices Frank-
furter and Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.277 Id. at 516.
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This dictum shortly became the law. Cox v. New Hampshire78
was a situation where a number of Jehovah's Witnesses had been
convicted for marching down the main street of Manchester with-
out the "parade permit" required by city ordinance. The Witnesses
contended that they had a right under the "freedom of speech" pro-
visions of the Constitution to communicate with by-standers by
means of a public parade, with or without a permit. The Supreme
Court rejected this contention and upheld the convictions. Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes said in explanation that:
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order with-
out which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unre-
strained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately de-
pend.2 7 9
When a city or state enacts a well-defined "permit" law, those
who use the city streets or parks without a license can be punished,
even though the licensing officials misapply and abuse the licensing
system. Poulos v. New Hampshire's° As Mr. Justice Black so
aptly said in his dissent: "Poulos can be branded a criminal for
making a talk at the very time and place which the State Supreme
Court has held its licensing officials could not legally forbid."28 '
In that case, the Court again reaffirmed the power of New Hamp-
shire to regulate the time, place and manner for use of the streets
for discussion purposes."' But the city council of Portsmouth had
," 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
27DId. at 574.
380345 U.S. 395 (1953).
281345 U.S. at 422.
"' The Court quoted with approval from its earlier decision in Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-161 (1939):
Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep
their communities' streets open and available for movement of people
and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated.
So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional
liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through
speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the
conduct of those using the streets. For example, a person could not
exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded
street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the
stoppage of all traffic; a group of distributors could not insist upon a
constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no
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gone beyond the regulation of time, place, and manner, and denied
a permit for a park discussion in a manner which was "arbitrary."
The Jehovah's Witnesses used the park anyway and were convicted
of speaking without the required permit. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the theory that those
unlawfully denied the permit could not take the law into their own
hands, but had to seek redress in court proceedings.82
Poulos contended that his right to free speech could not be
denied by a "wrongful refusal of the license" or by the requirement
that he postpone his right while seeking court redress. His con-
tention was that he "may risk speaking without a license and defeat
prosecution by showing the license was arbitrarily withheld.' 25 8
The Supreme Court (per Mr. Justice Reed) rejected this conten-
tion and affirmed the conviction:
It must be admitted that judicial correction of arbitrary re-
fusal by administrators to perform official duties under valid
laws is exulcerating and costly.... Delay is unfortunate, but the
expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens must pay
for life in an orderly society where the rights of the First
Amendment have a real and abiding meaning. Nor can we say
that a state's requirement that redress must be sought through
appropriate judicial procedure violates due process.28 4
Earlier decisions, however, hold that when the statute, ordinance
or custom is not restricted to regulation of the time, place, and
manner of street use, when the statute does not set sufficient stan-
dards to guide the administrative licensing processes, in short, when
the statute permits the licensing officials to play favorites, the sanc-
tions of the statute may not be imposed against one who uses the
streets without a permit.
In Kunz v. New York 285 a Baptist minister was convicted for
pedestrian to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the
guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a municipality of
power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the
streets....
345 U.S. at 406 n.1l.
.8a State v. Poulos, 97 N.H. 352, 88 A.2d 860 (1952).
2811345 U.S. at 409.
84 Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred and pointed out that "there
is nothing in the record to suggest that the remedy to which the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire confined Poulos effectively frustrated his right of
utterance, let alone that it circumvented his constitutional right by a
procedural pretense." Id. at 419-20.288340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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"street preaching" without a license. He had been denied a license
because, in earlier meetings, he had ridiculed and denounced other
religious beliefs. The city ordinance under which he had been
convicted required a permit from the City Police Commissioner
as a condition precedent to use of the streets for discussion purposes,
but the ordinance failed to set out any standards to control the
commissioner when he was requested to issue a permit. For this
reason, the Court (per Mr. Chief Justice Vinson) held that the
ordinance was unconstitutional and the conviction of Kunz invalid:
Although this Court has recognized that a statute may be enacted
which prevents serious interference with normal usage of streets
and parks.... we have consistently condemned licensing systems
which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or
withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regula-
tion of public places.286
The companion case of Niemotko v. Marylan&87 is similar.
There, the town of Havre de Grace had no laws related to park
use, but there was a custom to apply for a use permit from the park
commissioner. The Jehovah's Witnesses applied for use of a park
for a religious meeting, and were denied. At approximately the
same time, the Elks were permitted to use the park for a Flag Day
ceremony, and the park was used often by other religious organiza-
tions for Sunday-school picnics. When the park commissioner
denied them a permit, the Witnesses appealed to the City Council.
They were there asked about their refusal to salute the flag, their
views on the Bible, on "other issues irrelevant to unencumbered
use of the public parks." The Witnesses were denied a permit, but
used the park anyway. For this use they were convicted of dis-
orderly conduct. The Supreme Court (per Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson) reversed the conviction:
In the instant case we are met with no ordinance or statute regu-
lating or prohibiting the use of the park; all that is here is an
amorphous 'practice'.... No standards appear anywhere; no
narrowly drawn limitations; no circumscribing of this absolute
power.... Inasmuch as the basis of the convictions was the lack
of the permits, and that lack was, in turn, due to the unconstitu-
tional defects discussed, the convictions must fall.
288
280 340 U.S. at 293-4. (Citation omitted.)
2. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
288 340 U.S. at 271-72, 273.
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The holdings in the Kunz and Niemotko cases were applied in
Fowler v. Rhode Island.28 9 There, the City of Pawtucket had an
ordinance which provided quite simply that "No person shall ad-
dress any political or religious meeting in any public park .... ,,290
However, this statute had been interpreted to permit church serv-
ices in the park. But when the Jehovah's Witnesses held a park
meeting (the text was "The Pathway to Peace"), the minister was
arrested and convicted for violation of the ordinance. The Supreme
Court (per Mr. Justice Douglas) reversed because the testimony
plainly shows that a religious service of Jehovah's Witnesses is
treated differently than a religious service of other sects. That
amounts to the state preferring some religious groups over this
one. In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-273, we had
a case on all fours with this one. There a public park, open to all
religious groups, was denied Jehovah's Witnesses because of the
dislike which the local officials had of these people and their
views. That was a discrimination which we held to be barred
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 91
These "improper standards" and "discriminatory application"
cases in no way weaken the basic authority of the state to regulate
the use of public streets. This state power is illustrated by the
"sound truck" decision of Kovacs v. Cooper.292 Trenton, New
Jersey, enacted an ordinance which prohibited the use of a sound
truck which emits "loud and raucous" noises, and applied the penal-
ties of this ordinance to Kovacs as he cruised around the scene of
a strike, broadcasting music and the labor union views about the
strike. Kovacs argued that the ordinance prohibiting the street
broadcasts infringed upon his freedom of speech, but the Supreme
Court (per Mr. Justice Reed) rejected this contention: "City streets
are recognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech
or paper. But this does not mean the freedom is beyond all con-
trol." '293 The Court then discussed the distraction (and danger)
caused by sound trucks in downtown traffic, and the necessity for
quiet and tranquility in residential areas. The Court then concluded:
Opportunity to gain the public's ears by objectionably amplified
sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free
289345 U.S. 67 (1953).
280 Quoted in ibid.
291 Id. at 69.
203 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
293Id. at 87.
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speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings
on the streets.... To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of
the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself....
We think that the need for reasonable protection in the homes
or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped
with such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance. 94
If "loud and raucous" sound trucks can be barred from the city
streets in the interest of downtown traffic safety and suburban
tranquility, it seems that large groups of demonstrators can be
barred from the city streets in the interest of traffic flow. Such is
the implication of Cox v. Louisiana,295 although the conviction was
there reversed for other reasons.
On December 14, 1961, twenty-three students from Southern
University were arrested in downtown Baton Rouge for picketing
stores that maintained segregated lunch counters. That night, the
local CORE chapter decided to demonstrate against these arrests
in front of the courthouse where the students were imprisoned on
upper floors. The next morning about 2,000 students left the
campus and walked the five miles (the drivers of their busses had
been arrested) to the Old State Capitol building in downtown
Baton Rouge. The student leaders were there arrested under an
anti-noise statute for using a loudspeaker, so the Reverend Cox, a
Field Secretary for CORE, took over. He led the students in an
orderly procession two and a half blocks to the courthouse where a
number of policemen directed them to the sidewalk on the far side
2
' Id. at 87-89. Mr. Justice Black read the record as meaning that all
sound trucks were outlawed in Trenton, not only those which emitted "loud
and raucous noises." He therefore dissented on the theory that a city could
not outlaw one of the competing media of communication, especially the
only media which was accessible to the poor. He said:
There are many people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate
but who do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants,
newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places.
Yet everybody knows the vast reaches of these powerful channels of
communications which from the very nature of our economic system
must be under the control and guidance of comparatively few people.
On the other hand, public speaking is done by many men of divergent
minds with no centralized control over the ideas they entertain so as to
limit the causes they espouse .... And it is an obvious fact that public
speaking today without sound amplifiers is a wholly inadequate way to
reach the people on a large scale. Consequently, to tip the scales against
transmission of ideas through public speaking, as the Court does today,
is to deprive the people of a large part of the basic advantages of the
receipt of ideas that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Id. at 102-03. Justices Douglas and Rutledge joined in this dissent.
2°5379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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of the street. Cox explained to the Chief of Police that the program
would consist of songs (the Star Spangled Banner and a freedom
song), the Lord's Prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and a short
speech. The program proceeded as scheduled until the speech.
Then, as Cox read the list of segregated restaurants and urged sit-
ins, the law enforcement officials told him and the students that the
demonstrations must be broken up. The students did not move,
the deputies started to shove the students, and a policeman began
shooting tear gas shells at the crowd. The students ran in all
directions, and Cox was arrested and then convicted under a variety
of charges, including violation of the Louisiana "Obstructing Public
Passages" statute. This statute made it unlawful for any person to
"wilfully obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any public
sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley, road, or other passageway
... by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traffic
or passage thereon or therein." A proviso to this statute exempted
labor unions while engaged in "picketing, lawful assembly or con-
certed activity in the interest of its members. ... "'a
The record in the case, and oral argument to the Court, dis-
closed that "certain meetings and parades are permitted in Baton
Rouge, even though they have the effect of obstructing traffic" and
that "the authorities in Baton Rouge permit or prohibit parades or
street meetings in their completely uncontrolled discretion.1
2 7
For this reason, the Court (per Mr. Justice Goldberg) reversed
the conviction:
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to de-
termine which expressions of view will be permitted and which
will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons
or groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad
discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent
of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad
prohibitory statute.298
-21 Id. at 553.
.27 Id. at 556-57.
298Id. at 557-58. Mr. Justice Black concurred in this result, but for
different reasons. He wrote that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
require that if the streets of a town are open to some vievs, they must be
open to all." Id. at 580. In the proviso exempting labor unions from the
general prohibition, "Louisiana is attempting to pick and choose among
the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets.... This seems to me
to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 581. Mr. Justice Clark joined in this
concurring opinion. Mr. Justice White dissented, reading the record as not
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While reversing the conviction, the Court emphasized that "The
rights of free speech and assembly... still do not mean that every-
one with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any
public place and at any time." The Court reiterated that "The
constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order," and that "Govern-
mental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their
streets open and available for movement." The Court gave illus-
trations: "One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red
light because this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor
could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street
meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form
of freedom of speech and assembly." 99 The Court concluded
that it is,
of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited discretion, under
properly drawn statutes or ordinances concerning the time, place,
duration, or manner of use of the streets for public assembly may
be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited
discretion is exercised with uniformity of treatment... free from
improper or inappropriate considerations... with reference to
the convenience of public use of the highways.300
Under existing decisions, then, the Constitutional freedom of
speech provisions do not preclude the states from enacting statutes
punishing street blocking tactics similar to those used by the Chapel
Hill demonstrators. But, some speculation is nevertheless war-
ranted.
Mr. Justice Black pointed out in Kovacs that "Ideas and beliefs
are today chiefly disseminated to the masses of people through the
press, radio, moving pictures, and public address systems." 301
Television should now be added to this group. Mr. Justice Black
also pointed out that these powerful channels of communications
"from the very nature of our economic system must be under the
control and guidance of comparatively few people." 302  Certainly,
few minority groups control or guide these media of mass com-
munication. Other forms of communication-the public meeting,
showing that any demonstration similar in intensity and location had ever
been before permitted. Mr. Justice Harlan joined in this dissent.200 Id. at 554.
"O Id. at 558.
001336 U.S. at 102.
802 Ibid.
19651
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
picket line, the letter to the editor, even loud but non-raucous sound-
trucks-are generally restricted in audience. If the message of
protest is to be heard, resort must be had to the bizarre, the im-
polite, the offensive, the unruly tactic which makes front-page news.
The attention-gaining assets of these tactics suggest that they
will continue to be utilized, someday perhaps with grudging court
approval. The sister communication techniques of the poor were
at one time beyond the pale and gained but an evolutionary ac-
ceptance. This is true of picketing, 30 3 street parades,8" 4 park meet-
ings, 305 leaflet distributions, 08 and now possibly sit-ins in places of
public accommodation.30  The free speech mantle slowly spread
over these activities might someday be extended to a street block-
ing situation where the protest rings true, the target is well marked,
and the general public not inconvenienced: for example, a Negro
sit-down blocking the entrance to a government-sponsored con-
struction project where the contractor employs "white only." After
all, the flow of ideas is just as important to a city as is the flow of
traffic; and on appropriate occasion in limited situations, perhaps
even more so.
D. Picketing and Freedom of Speech
It will be remembered that the Chapel Hill Board of Aldermen
enacted an ordinance which made it illegal to picket between 7:00
p.m. and 7:00 a.m. This ordinance was passed at the request of
the Chief of Police, who lacked sufficient manpower to protect the
picketers from hoodlums during the hours of darkness. Although
this ordinance never became law,308 several other communities have
enacted similar laws, °9 and the problem warrants a brief discussion.
The picket sign is the poor man's newspaper, and as such is
protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
press. This has been established law for over twenty-five years.
... Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
... Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
.0 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
"0' Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
0. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
.0. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
"'o Thomasville, N.C., has an ordinance which includes the clause that
"Picketing shall be prohibited between the hours of 9 p.m. and 7 a.m."
Thomasville Times, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 10, col. 1. Danville, Virginia, has an
ordinance which requires that "All picketing ... shall be during the business
or work hours of the place of business or public facility being picketed...."
8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 698 (1963).
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Thornhill v. Alabama.310  There, Thornhill was arrested, while on
a union picket line, pursuant to an Alabama statute which punished
picketing "the works or place of business of such other persons...
for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with ... any
lawful business or enterprise of another."3 1' The State sought to
justify this ban on picketing at the location of strikes as a "pro-
tection of the community from the violence and breaches of the
peace, which... are the concomitants of picketing." '12  The Su-
preme Court rejected this contention and said: "[The] streets are
natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of ex-
pression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place." ' 3
In the companion case of Carlson v. California31 4 the Court
struck down a similar municipal ordinance, which banned picketing
at or near the scenes of industrial disputes, with this comment:
The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising of a
flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information
on matters of public concern.... [P]ublicizing the facts of a
labor dispute in a peaceful way through appropriate means,
whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must now
be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is
secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgement by a State.3 15
Labor unions are not singled out as favorites. Any person and
any group enjoys this freedom. State efforts to restrict the right to
picket to striking employees have been rebuffed by the Supreme
Court,31 and the Supreme Court has protected the rights of civil
rights organizations to picket for equal employment opportuni-
ties,317 unless, of course, the organization violates the state policy
against "fair employment" by insisting upon an arbitrary and fixed
"Negro quota."31 8
The right to picket is not absolute. A state can punish picketing
310 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
... Quoted in id. at 91.
312 Id. at 105.
2 2Id. at 105-06. (The brackets are the Court's.)
214310 U.S. 106 (1940).
215Id. at 112-13.
.1. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
"" New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
"'Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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when "used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute" because "it has never been deemed an abridge-
ment of freedom of speech ... to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or car-
ried out by means of language." '19  A state can enjoin picketing
which is "enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct [by
the union] which is concededly outlawed" ;320 but when the union
violence is "scattered in time and much of it. . . unconnected with
the picketing," the Supreme Court will permit an injunction against
the violence but not against the picketing itself.3 21
Picketing may be enjoined to protect the neutrals in a labor dis-
pute,322 to protect the employees' free choice of bargaining repre-
sentatives,3 2 and to protect the right of non-union men in a right-
to-work-law state from illegal discharge.3 24  But it has never been
suggested that picketing may be enjoined to protect the picketers
from attacks by hoodlums. Indeed, the Court in Meadowmoor
Dairies commented on this and said that a state may not "enjoin
peaceful picketing merely because it may provoke violence in
others.3s25  This is in accord with many similar situations wherein
the Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights are not to be
sacrificed because of extreme public hostility to the exercise of those
rights.3 2
6
... Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949).
Here, a union was enjoined from picketing where the purpose of the
picketing was to compel the employer to violate a valid state anti-trust law.
820 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 292 (1941).8 1Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957).
.22 Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
... Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950).
82. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters, 345
U.S. 192 (1953).
82. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 296 (1941).
826 Some of these cases follow in chronological order. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958). "[L]aw and order are not here to be preserved by
depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights" to attend de-
segregated schools. Id. at 16. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
Negro students at "white" lunch counters cannot be arrested for breach of
peace because their presence is "offensive to another class of the public."
Id. at 167. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962). Negro bus pas-
sengers cannot be arrested because their presence "in a white waiting room
was likely to give rise to a breach of the peace." Id. at 155. Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The state may not apply "breach of
the peace" laws to Negro students who march in large numbers to the State
Capitol as "The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make
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When the Chapel Hill anti-picketing ordinance was originally
passed, the student Daily Tar Heel editorialized that "you do not
take away a man's constitutional right to picket because your police
force is overworked and underpaid-... or because you fear some
hoodlum may attack a picketer." '3 27 The student editor there cap-
suled in a neat package a host of applicable Supreme Court de-
cisions.
E. Public Accommodation Laws and Municipal Authority
There is nothing new or novel about a law requiring all mem-
bers of the public to be given equal access to private facilities
licensed by the state to serve the public generally. A century ago
Massachusetts enacted a law which prohibited any "distinction,
discrimination or restriction on account of race or color... in any
licensed inn, in any public place of amusement, public conveyance or
public meeting in this commonwealth."32 8  Four years later, in
1869, Congress wrote a similar law for the District of Columbia;
and in 1874, Kansas and New York followed the lead of Massa-
chusetts. In 1884, Iowa, New Jersey, Ohio, and Connecticut passed
such laws, and the following year seven others-Colorado, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and Rhode Island-fol-
lowed suit. By 1964, some thirty-four states had enacted anti-
discrimination laws in privately owned places of public accom-
modations s29
There is no question about the constitutionality of these state
anti-discrimination laws. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi"3 8  con-
cerned a New York law which forbade any labor organization to
criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. '[A] function of free
speech... is to invite dispute.'" Id. at 237. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S.
284 (1963). Six young Negroes cannot be punished for peacefully playing
basketball in a public park because "the possibility of disorder by others
cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place if they otherwise have a
constitutional right.., to be present." Id. at 293. Henry v. City of Rock
Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964). South Carolina cannot punish Negroes who
demonstrate in front of the City Hall to protest segregations upon evidence
which "'showed no more than that the opinions which they were peaceably
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the
community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection."' Id. at
777-78.
... Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 15, 1964, p. 2, col. 2.
= Quoted in id., Feb. 19, 1964, p. 2, col. 1 (wire-service story).
8" They are listed, with citations and dates of enactment, in the appendix
to the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
284 (1964).
f 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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deny membership or representation to anyone on the basis of race,
color or creed. A union contended that this law "offends the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an interference
with its right of selection to membership and abridgement of its
property rights and liberty of contract." '' The Court (per Mr.
Justice Reed) rejected these contentions with the comment that
there is "no constitutional basis for the contention that a state can-
not protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color
or creed by an organization, functioning under the protection of the
state, which holds itself out to represent the general business needs
of employees." 332  Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, said, "to
argue against this contention is to dignify a claim devoid of con-
stitutional substance.
333
In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,83 4 the constitutionality
of a state public accommodations law was conceded, 35 the appellant
contesting only the power of Michigan to apply its law to an ex-
cursion boat which carried vacationers from Detroit to an amuse-
ment park on an island in Canadian waters, and back to Detroit.
The Court (per Mr. Justice Rutledge) admitted that the "voyage"
was in "foreign commerce" within the meaning of the Commerce
Clause, but then held that because of the "special local interest" in
preventing discrimination, the Michigan law was applicable: "Cer-
tainly there is no national interest which overrides the interest of
Michigan to forbid the type of discrimination practiced here." '
Finally, in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Conti-
nental Air Lines, Inc.,3 3 7 the Court (per Mr. Justice Black) sus-
tained the constitutionality of a state "fair employment practices"
act as applied to the employment of a pilot by an interstate air
carrier. The air line argued that it was in interstate commerce,
and hence subject to Congressional (to the exclusion of state)
311 Id. at 93.
"
2 Id. at 94.
3
'
3 Id. at 98.
.8, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
"' The Supreme Court of Michigan has sustained the statute against
fourteenth amendment contentions, People v. Bob-Lo Excursion Co., 317
Mich. 686, 27 N.W.2d 139 (1947), and Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring,
cited Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945), for the proposition
that "the police power of a State under our constitutional system is adequate
for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens against discrimination by
reason of race or color." 333 U.S. at 41.
2"Id. at 40.887372 U.S. 714 (1963).
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regulation. The Court held that hiring within a state of an em-
ployee is a "localized matter," and, moreover, there was no possi-
bility of conflicting regulation by Congress or by other states be-
cause "any state or federal law requiring applicants for any job to
be turned away because of their color would be invalid under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 8
The same constitutional arguments made against the validity
of a state public accommodations law were repeated when Congress
in 1964 passed a national public accommodations law. The Su-
preme Court upheld this statute in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States33 9 and said that the law requiring motel and restau-
rant owners to serve all patrons regardless of race did not "deprive
[the owners] of liberty or property,"3 40 was not a law taking "prop-
erty without just compensation," 34 ' and did not put the restaurant
owner in a position of "involuntary servitude."34 2  The Court
pointed out that "32 States now have such statutes and no case
has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute has been
successful, either in federal or state courts." 343
City governments, when the state is slow to act or otherwise is
uninterested in local municipal problems, have enacted public ac-
commodation laws. Cleveland, Ohio, led the way in 1934, followed
by Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the 1940's, laws pro-
hibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations, in em-
ployment, in housing, or in transportation were enacted in Chicago,
Minneapolis, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Phoenix, New
York City, Richmond, California, and elsewhere.344 The trend has
continued, and in very recent periods public accommodations laws
have been enacted by cities in Delaware (Wilmington) ;345 Kansas
28 Id. at 721.
379 U.S. 241 (1964). In the companion case of Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the law was upheld as applied to Ollie's
Barbeque, a family-owned restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, catering to
a family and white-collar local trade with a take-out service for Negroes.
310 379 U.S. at 258.
"I" Id. at 261.
*"Ibid.
"'Id. at 260.
" The list of cities with citations is set forth in John R. Thompson Co.
v. District of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579, 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
"' 6 RAcE REL. L. REP. 885 (1961).
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(Kansas City) ;.46 Kentucky (Louisville) ;847 Maryland (Rock-
ville84 and Montgomery County);840 Missouri (Kansas City,350
St. Joseph,3"1 and St. Louis) ;352 Oklahoma (Oklahoma City8" 8 and
Tulsa) ;354 and Texas (Corpus Christi855 and El Paso).""
These local laws take various forms. They vary in coverage.
Some include all kinds of public accommodations-restaurants, inns,
grocery stores, shoeshine parlors, barber shops, gas stations, the
whole gamut. Others are more restrictive. Typically, private clubs,
taverns, and barber shops are often excluded in the initial enact-
ments, and sometimes later included when the law proves workable.
The laws also vary in methods of enforcement. Some operate by
a licensing system: the license is revoked if the establishment dis-
criminates often enough. Others utilize criminal sanctions. Still
others use civil injunctive methods; and others create private causes
of action and leave enforcement in the hands of those who suffer the
discrimination.
Although there are many possibilities available when consider-
ing the enactment of a public accommodations law, cities do not
have an entirely free hand. A city is an agent of the state legisla-
ture to deal with localized problems, and has only those powers
which the state legislature deems expedient to vest upon it. A
state legislature may be generous, it may be parsimonious. As a
general proposition, a city has only those powers granted in express
terms or by implication, and those essential to the achievement of
the declared objects and purposes of the municipality. 57 When
the power of a city to enact a public accommodations law is chal-
lenged, there are two questions to be faced: (1) Does the State
have constitutional authority to delegate this power to the city?
3488 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1682 (1963).
8 RACE REL. L. REP. 719 (1963).
'" 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 266 (1962).
847 RAcE REL. L. REP. 263 (1962).
3508 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1684 (1963).
* 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1686 (1963).
...6 RACE REL. L. REP. 881 (1961).
9 RACE REL. L. REP. 998 (1964).
3549 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1001 (1964).
9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1897 (1964).
7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1265 (1962).
... See, e.g., Comment, Validity of Municipal Law Barring Discrimina-
tion in Private Housing, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 728 (1958); Note, Municipal
Contracts and Provisions for a Minimum Wage: Constitutional Considera-
tions of State and Local Authority, 47 VA. L. REv. 828, 841 (1961).
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(The answer here is clearly yes.) (2) Did in fact the State dele-
gate this power to the city, either expressly or by implication?
Answer to the second question must be sought in the general
legislation applicable to all cities, and in the specific legislation ap-
plicable to the municipality in question. North Carolina and the
other states delegate authority to cities in both of these ways. In
answering these questions, doubt may be resolved against the grant
of this power if the city ordinance is in conflict with or inconsistent
with a state public policy as manifest in legislation of state-wide
application.
Although many cities have enacted local anti-discrimination
ordinances, their power to do so has been challenged on only rare
occasions. When the issue has arisen, the decision depends upon
the localized situation. Nevertheless, the few existing cases give
some guidance.
The first such case was Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc.358
There, the tavern refused to serve Nance, and Nance brought suit
for damages pursuant to a Salt Lake City ordinance which made it
unlawful for a restaurant owner to refuse service to an "orderly
person." The Utah Supreme Court held that this ordinance, if
designed as a "civil rights" measure, was "invalid as being beyond
the delegated power of the city enacting it."' 59
Nance sought to show that the Utah legislature had delegated
sufficient authority to Salt Lake City in a general statute which
granted all Utah cities the power to "license, tax and regulate" not
only restaurants, but also a host of other activities: hawking, pawn
brokers, boarding houses, laundries, barber shops, storage houses,
photographers, billboards, etc. 6' The Utah Supreme Court held
that there was no "express" grant of authority here to enact civil
rights laws, and that the power was not granted by implication:
If the statute which authorizes cities to tax, license and regulate
restaurants were to be construed as empowering the city to pass
a civil rights bill regarding restaurants, the section would also
have to be construed so as to permit civil rights legislation by
cities in regard to all businesses and occupations enumerated in
the same section. It is clear that the legislature never contem-
plated that cities should have such powers. Even the most liberal
... 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).
" Id. at 521, 150 P.2d at 775.810Id. at 520, 150 P.2d at 775.
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civil rights statutes do not purport to embrace many of the types
of businesses enumerated in this section.3 61
A Wilmington, Delaware, public accommodations law was also
invalidated for lack of city authority to enact such a law. Mayor &
Council of Wilmington v. Smentkowski. 62 There, the city sought
to justify power to enact the ordinance under a state-wide law
which gave cities the general power "to do all those matters and
things for the well being of the said city which shall not be in con-
travention of any existing laws of this State... .,,"31 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court, however, had recently held that the state
"innkeeper" statute gave restaurant owners the right to discrimi-
nate against Negro patrons. 364  The city ordinance banning segre-
gation, therefore, was "in contravention" of an existing state law
and beyond the power conferred upon the city.
Marshall v. Kansas City36 concerned a different degree of city
authority, with a different result. Kansas City enacted an ordi-
nance making it unlawful for any restaurant, hotel or motel to
refuse to serve any person because of race or color. Marshall, who
owned a restaurant, brought suit against the ordinance on the
theory, inter alia, that the city lacked authority to enact such a law.
The city defended its authority under a charter from the state legis-
lature which granted power " 'to license, tax and regulate any and
every person" engaged in the restaurant business and to "regulate
all acts ... businesses . . . [and] trades . . . detrimental . . . to the
health, morals, comfort, prosperity, safety, convenience or welfare
of the inhabitants .... "366
The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the city power under
this statute. The "essential question," said the court, "is how much
of the state's police power to regulate businesses and vocations at the
so" Id. at 520, 150 P.2d at 774-75.
28 198 A.2d 685 (Del. 1964).
8.. Quoted in id. at 686. (Emphasis added.)
... State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963). The four Supreme Courtjustices who passed upon this issue held that this "innkeepers law," "au-
thorizing discriminatory classification... is offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715,
728 (1961) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court held that the
restaurant segregation there in issue was unconstitutional for other reasons.
The Delaware "innkeepers" law permitting segregation had been repealed
and a state-wide public accommodations law had been substituted by the
time of the Smentkowski decision. 198 A.2d at 687.
-02 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
116 Id. at 881.
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local level can be and has been delegated to the defendant city. 36 7
The court concluded that enough of the state's police power had been
delegated:
We are constrained to hold that this municipal ordinance,
designed to prevent discrimination by reason of race or color in
restaurants, bears a substantial and reasonable relation to the
specific grant of power to regulate restaurants and to the health,
comfort, safety, convenience, and welfare of the inhabitants of the
city and is fairly referable to the police power of the municipal
corporation. 368
In Marshall, the Missouri Supreme Court placed great reliance
on the United States Supreme Court decision in District of Co-
lumbia v. John R. Thompson Co.3 9  That case is somewhat
unique in its factual setting. In 1871, Congress gave "home rule"
to the District of Columbia with power in its people to elect a
Legislative Assembly, and gave to the assembly all the powers of a
municipal corporation. The assembly in 1873 enacted a law making
it criminal for any restaurant to deny service on the basis of race.
"Home rule" for the District was short lived. In 1901, Congress
established a "Commission" form of government for the District,
and repealed all "general and permanent" laws enacted by the
assembly, but expressly retained in force all "police regulations"
and "acts relating to municipal affairs only."3 '
In 1950, the District of Columbia convicted the Thompson Com-
pany under the 1873 law when it refused to serve a Negro in one
of its restaurants. The Thompson Company argued that the 1873
assembly had exceeded its powers as a "municipal corporation"
when it enacted the public accommodations law, and that in any
event, the law had been repealed in 1901 because it was a "general
and permanent" type of law rather than a "police regulation" or an
act "relating to municipal affairs.
3 7 1
The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It held that the
police power of a municipality includes the power to enact legisla-
tion
in the interest of peace and order and conducive to the morals
and general welfare of the community....
807 Ibid.
Id. at 883.
"'346 U.S. 100 (1953).
870 Id. at 111-12.
8 11 Id. at 112.
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It is our view that these anti-discrimination laws governing
restaurants in the District are 'police regulations' and acts 're-
lating to municipal affairs'....
The laws which require equal service to all who eat in
restaurants ... are as local in character as laws regulating public
health, schools, streets, and parks.372
At least two state attorney generals have given a similar broad
construction to legislative grants of "police powers." The At-
torney General of Nevada ruled that the statute authorizing the
State Gaming Commission to license all gaming establishments
"so as to better protect the public health, safety, morals, good order
and general welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Nevada" in-
cluded the power to determine that racial exclusion from gaming
establishments is "inimical to the.., good order and general wel-
fare" and therefore reason for revoking the licenses of Jim Crow
gaming establishments.37 3  More directly on point, the Attorney
General of Maryland recently advised the City of Cambridge that
when the Maryland legislature authorized it "by ordinance, to re-
quire any and all things to be done which will promote the welfare,
good government and prosperity of the people of the town," the
legislature thereby granted authority to enact an ordinance pro-
hibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation. 74
Reference must also be made to the so-called Jim Crow cases.
There, various cities throughout the South required segregation of
the races, and the courts in Georgia, Texas, Virginia, and Florida
upheld these ordinances as within the bounds of municipal power3 15
If the "police power" delegated by a state legislature to a city
authorizes the city to require segregation in restaurants, the identi-
cal grants of "police power" authorize the city to cope with the same
racial problems by requiring equal treatment. 70
So much for a general background. Now it is time to examine
the powers granted by the North Carolina legislature to Chapel Hill
and other municipalities within the state.
North Carolina General Statutes section 160-200 grants to all
cities the power:
SId. at 112-13.
6 RAcE. REL. L. REP. 1234, 1235 (1961).
8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 763, 764 (1963).
, The cases are cited and discussed in John R. Thompson Co. v. District
of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1953).3"" Id. at 601.
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(6) To supervise, regulate, or suppress, in the interest of
public morals ... and to define, prohibit, abate, or suppress all
things detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, con-
venience, and welfare of the people....
(7) To pass such ordinances as are expedient for maintaining
and promoting the peace, good government, and welfare of the
city, and the morals and happiness of its citizens, and for the
performance of all municipal functions....
(10) To make and enforce local police, sanitary, and other
regulations.3 77
It will be noted that these delegated powers are broader than
the delegated powers involved in the Utah Nance case3 83 and in the
Delaware Smentkowski case,3 79 but are quite similar to those in the
Missouri, 80 District of Columbia,8 ' and Maryland situations 9 2
wherein the authorities held that the power delegated to the cities
was adequate to support a public accommodation law.
Under these powers granted by the North Carolina legislature,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has sustained municipal ordi-
nances which regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages,3 3 require
Sunday closing,"" prohibited the keeping of cows,38 5 and zone
the location of lumber yards.8 6
The North Carolina legislature not only grants "municipal"
powers to all cities by way of general legislation, it sometimes
grants specific powers to designated cities. The North Carolina
legislature has granted Chapel Hill a power not granted to all
cities, namely, the power "to regulate or to license any occupations,
businesses, trades, or forms of amusement or entertainment in the
interest of the public health, welfare, order or safety, and to pro-
hibit such as may be inimical to the public health, welfare, order
or safety." 387  This power makes the Kansas City case388 a strong
precedent for the validity of a public accommodations law in
Chapel Hill.
*,, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-200 (1964).
... Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944).
Mayor & Council of Wilmington v. Smentkowski, 198 A.2d 685 (1964).
80 Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
.81 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
...8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 763, 764 (1963).
... State v. Austin, 114 N.C. 855, 19 S.E. 919 (1894).
88, State v. Trantham, 230 N.C. 641, 55 S.E.2d 198 (1949).
... State v. Stowe, 190 N.C. 79, 128 S.E. 481 (1925).
Turner v. City of New Bern, 187 N.C. 541, 122 S.E. 469 (1924).
N.C. SESs. LAWS 1961, ch. 87, sub ch. D, § 5.41.
.88 Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
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In June of 1963, Chapel Hill's Mayor McClamroch requested
both the state Attorney General and the University of North Caro-
lina Institute of Government to advise on the legal authority of
Chapel Hill to enact a public accommodations law.
The Institute of Government replied in a twenty-page memo-
randum with a conclusion that "although there is some doubt, there
seems to be legal authority to pass a public accommodations ordi-
nance." The Attorney General replied in a one-page letter that:
"It is our official opinion that in North Carolina this is an open
question and that no one can advise you with any degree of legal
certainty what the Supreme Court would rule in such a situation."
The Attorney General then added that "It is the writer's personal
opinion that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would probably
say that such a power to pass such an ordinance has not been dele-
gated to Chapel Hill or any other municipality in this State."' "
The disagreement between the Institute of Government and
the "personal opinion" of the Attorney General might never be re-
solved. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-prohibit-
ing discrimination in restaurants, soda fountains, motels, inns,
theaters, sports arenas, movies, and similar places of public accom-
modation-has blunted the drive for a local law of similar import.
But not all establishments are covered by the federal law. The
ordinary barber shop, a bowling alley, a beer tavern, suggest the
types of public places not covered by the federal law and the con-
tinuing need for local laws. But unless and until the community
of Chapel Hill enacts a public accommodations law fitting its par-
ticular needs, its legal powers to act must remain unclear, although
legal precedent from other jurisdictions favors the legitimacy of
such legislation.
88. Subsequently, in a long memorandum, the Attorney General advised
the City of Durham that it could not enact a public accommodations law.
The Attorney General primarily relied on the proposition that municipal
ordinances must harmonize with the general laws of the state, and that a
municipal public accommodations law would conflict with, and therefore
must yield to, the state trespass statutes, which had been construed by the
state supreme court to permit the owner of a business establishment to
exclude patrons on the basis of race or color. 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 435(1964). Since the Attorney General rendered this opinion, the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that the North Carolina state trespass laws
cannot be so applied. Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965).
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F. Conclusion
There are other legal problems arising out of the Chapel Hill
situation which cannot be discussed here and now because of space
limitations. The problem of removing state criminal prosecutions
to federal courts pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 186690 is a
problem which lay dormant for many years but which now needs
examination. The severity of the sentences meted out by Judge
Mallard raises problems in a novel context and merits exploration.391
But these problems, and the events which gave them birth, could
have been minimized had Chapel Hill but heeded the words of its
most cherished literary son, Thomas Wolfe:
So, then, to every man his chance-to every man regardless
of his birth, his shining, golden opportunity-to every man the
right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become whatever
thing his manhood and his vision can combine to make him-
this, seeker, is the promise of America.392
In the bitter winter months of 1964, a small minority of
merchants, backed by the city officialdom, sought to deny the Negro
citizen "his shining, golden opportunity ... to be himself." The
consequence was disastrous to the participants, and to those caught
in the backlash. But the experiences are of potential benefit. The
pitfalls in healthy community relations are now marked. In the
future, they can be avoided; or even better, they can now be
repaired.
..o 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1959).
... Charliese Cotton, the seventeen-year-old daughter of a domestic, played
a very minor role in the demonstrations. But in August of 1964 Judge
Mallard sentenced her to six months in the Women's Prison, to an additional
eighteen-month term to begin anytime during the next five years at the
discretion of the court, and to a fine of $1,500. EHLE 316: For discussion
of some of the sentences, see Penegar, Criminal Law Sanctions in Two Civil
Rights Cases-A Brief Comparison, 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 667 (1965).
... WOLFE, YOU CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN 508 (1940), quoted in N.C.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
IN NORTH CAROLINA 229 (1962).
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